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FROM THE COUCH TO THE BENCH:
HOW SHOULD THE LEGAL SYSTEM
RESPOND TO RECOVERED MEMORIES
OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE?
WENDYJ. KISCH*
A woman in her thirties seeks therapy to overcome an eating disorder and
trouble with relationships. The therapist recognizes the woman's complaints
as signs of sexual abuse, despite the patient's denials. The therapist believes
that the patient may be suppressing memories of sexual abuse and suggests
that the patient think about it to see tf any memories surface. The patient re-
ports that she recalls herfather abusing her, but is not sure whether her memo-
ries are real. The therapist recommends using hypnotic regression as a means
of restoring the patient's memories. After the memories of abuse surface dur-
ing hypnosis, the patient becomes certain that she was sexually abused by her
father during her childhood.
The therapist discourages the patient from maintaining contact with any
family member who does not believe her. As part of her treatment, the patient
decides to sue herfatherfor the crime that is now twenty years old.
Although her father is acquitted, the woman still refuses to see him. Her
parents divorce and herfather loses his job. The woman moves away from her
home and her therapist. Eventually she concludes that she was wrong about
the sexual abuse. The memories that she thought were real were not her true
memories after all.
Realizing it was her therapist, not her father, who injured her, the woman
decides to sue her therapist for the pain she and herfamily have suffered.
Increasingly, society is becoming aware of the prevalence of child
sexual abuse and the consequences for its victims, even as they be-
*J.D., 1996, American University, Washington College of Law BA 1989 Binghamton University.
I -would like to thank Robert Dinerstein for his thoughtful comments throughout the develop-
ment of this paper.
1. This scenario is loosely based on the Maryland case of Donna Smith. Sea Eugene L.
Meyer, Poisoned Memon , WASH. POST, May 27, 1994, at DI (detailing the case and its after-
math).
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come adults This awareness has led to greater assistance for victims
and punishment for abusers 3 In addition to such positive develop-
ments, however, the growing concern to stop child sexual abuse may
also lead to negative consequences, such as an unfounded accep-
tance of the validity of recovered memories of sexual abuse.4 Reli-
ance on such "memories" can have devastating consequences, as this
comment will explain. Consequently, society's desire to remedy
childhood sexual abuse should not pressure the legal system to
blindly accept unproven theories, such as recovery of repressed
memories, both in the courtroom and the therapy session.
An increasing number of women report recovering memories" of
long-forgotten, childhood sexual abuse.7 These women and their
therapists believe that the memories were so painful that they were
repressed, stored in the unconscious, and later recovered." There is
also a trend of women recanting their initial "memories" of sexual
abuse.9 There is no consensus within the mental health field as to
whether memories can be repressed and later recovered. Experts
agree, however, that even if recovered memories are sometimes true,
2. S inftanotes 25-28 and accompanying text (describing common injuries).
3. SeeElizabeth F. Loftus, TheReality ofRePressedMemoe, AM. PsYCHOLOGIST, May 1993, at
518 (discussing changes in the legal system that favor victims in sexual abuse cases).
4. See, eg., Mark MacNamara, The Rise and Fall of the Reprewsed-Memoiy Theoy in the Court-
room, 15 CAL. LAW 36, 38 (1995) (quoting a 1991-92 San Diego County grand jury report, which
called the child protection system "out of control" and described the case ofJim Wade, who was
falsely accused of raping his eight year old daughter. The daughter originally told investigators
thata stranger climbed through her bedroom window. After speakingwith therapists, however,
she reported that her father had raped her. Two-and-one-half years later, Wade was cleared
through use of DNA evidence.).
5. Some men report recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse, but since women are
disproportionately affected, this paper will concentrate on the effects of recovered memories on
women. Many of the effects are applicable to male victims as well. According to the False
Memory Syndrome Foundation, a group comprised of families in which a child has accused an
adult of sexual abuse and of professionals in related fields, of those who allegedly recover
memories and accuse someone of abuse, 92% are female, 74% are between the ages of 31 and
50, 31% have post-college education, 60% report memories of abuse before the age of four and
64% report having repressed the memories for a period of between 20 and 39 years. Frequently
Asked Questions, FALSE MEMORY SYNDROME, (draft, False Memory Syndrome Found., Phila., Pa.)
Sept. 1995, at 9.
6. In. this paper, recovered and recalled memories will be used interchangeably to refer to
memories which were allegedly repressed and later remembered.
7. Cf.Jacqueline Kanovitz, H)pnotic Memoies and Civil SexualAbuse Tials, 45"VAND. L. REV.
1185, 1193 n.22 (1992) (listing several celebrities who report recovering repressed memories
including Roseanne Arnold, Oprah Winfrey, LaToyaJackson, and former Miss America Marilyn
Van Derbur).
8. But see infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text (suggesting that many experts do not
believe memories can be repressed and later recovered).
9. See, eg., Meyer, supra note 1, at D1 (recounting one family's experience with false
memories).
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there is no way for either the patient or the therapist to differentiate
between true and false memories. This dilemma has created a de-
bate regarding the use of such memories in therapy and in the
courtroom.
When examining the issues surrounding False Memory Syn-
drome, the first step is to establish whether recovered memories
are, in fact, true memories. Second, if the memories are not clearly
reliable, should they still should be used as evidence of childhood
sexual abuse? Finally, if recovered memories are used to prove in-
stances of childhood sexual abuse, which, in fact, never took place,
should patients, or the people they accuse, have legal recourse
against the therapist who encouraged "recovering" these false
memories?
Since the very field which researches recovered memories cannot
agree on their validity, the best way to protect the public is to pro-
hibit the use of questionable memories as evidence. The courtroom
is not the place to determine the validity of scientific theories. 2 In-
stead, the scientific community should determine the validity of sci-
entific theories and the jury and judge can then decide whether that
theory applies to the facts of the given situation. There must be a
balance between allowing scientific evidence to aid the court in de-
termining the validity of a claim and protecting the parties from
premature use of unverified scientific theories or techniques. In ad-
10. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION: REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENTIfic AFFAIRS,
MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD ABUSE (1994), reprinted in FMS FOUND. NEWSL. (False Memory Syn-
drome Found., Phila., Pa.) July 6,1994, at 10 (citing the difficulty in determining the validity of
repressed memories).
11. The term "False Memory Syndrome" was first coined by the False Memory Syndrome
Foundation. The Foundation defines the syndrome as a condition where a person has such a
strong belief in something that, although the belief is objectively fise, the person's identity is
based on the belief. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5, at 1. False Memory Syndrome is not
recognized by the American Psychiatric Association (hence it is not listed in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual IV (1994)). Since the term is widely used in literature on the topic, however,
itwill be used in this article as well.
12. When scientific theories or techniques are well established, they should be used in the
courtroom to help the judge orjury reach ajust outcome. When courts ignore scientific evi-
dence, injustice results. For instance, evidence of the Battered Woman Syndrome should be
used to help determine whether a woman should be considered culpable for murdering an abu-
sive husband. See generally A. Renee Callahan, Will the "Real" Battered Woman Please Stand Up? In
Search of a Realistic Legal Definition of Battered Woman Syndrome, S AMI. U. J. GENDER & L 117
(1994); see also Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffian-Brinks, Science and the Law in the
Wake ofDauber- A New Search For Sdentiic Knowedge, 72 TEX. L REV. 715, 719 (1994) (citing
Berryv. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442,451 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946)) (awarding child support in a pa-
ternity suit, even though blood typing proved Charlie Chaplin could not be the father) and
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), affid in part 788 F.2d
741,745 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that a spermicide caused birth defects, despite overwhelming
evidence to the contrary. When the 11th Circuit affirmed this judgment, the judge stated,
'[s] cience doesn't matter, if there was sufficient evidence of causation in a legal sense.")).
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dition, the public must be protected from negligent use of theories
and techniques within psychotherapy sessions as these theories and
techniques can significantly affect patients' mental health and the
well-being of their families. Recovered memories can destroy fami-
lies,'5 cause loss of employment,14 and result in jail sentences. 5 In
order to achieve just outcomes, courts should refrain from determin-
ing the validity of new, unverified scientific theories before the scien-
tific field has done so.
This paper begins with a summary of the debate among scientists
regarding recovered memories and False Memory Syndrome. It will
examine the characteristics of individuals who report recovering
memories of sexual abuse and discuss the scientific debate surround-
ing the validity of those memories.
Part II examines how the legal system facilitates claims based on
unproven scientific evidence. First, it will review the discovery rule,
which allows testimony of recovered memories to toll the statute of
limitations. Next, admission of novel scientific evidence will be stud-
ied, focusing on the shift from the "general acceptance" standard es-
tablished in Fye v. United Stated 6 to the reliance on the Federal Rules
of Evidence used in Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'7
Part III demonstrates the necessity for the legal system to provide
relief to those who are injured by a therapist's 8 negligent treatment
of recovered memories.
Finally, Part IV concludes that public interest dictates that courts
be wary of allowing new, unverified scientific evidence into the
courtroom. At the same time, the courts should provide remedies
when therapists injure patients through the use of unverified tech-
niques and careless diagnoses of recovered memories.
13. See Ramona v. Isabella, No. C61898 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 13, 1994) (involving a woman
filing for divorce after her adult daughter 'recovered' a memory of her father sexually abusing
her as a child); "Incest" Father Sues Girl's Therapist, THE OBsERvER, Apr. 17, 1984, at 18
(recounting details of the Ramona v. Isabella case).
14. Sandra G. Boodman, Kathy O'Connor of Arlington Says She Remembered That Her Father
Raped Her. She Sued Him And Lost. AreDelayed MemoriesLike Hers True OrFalse?, WASH. POST, Apr.
12, 1994, at Health Insert (explaining that Kathy O'Connor's accusations of sexual abuse by her
father caused both parents to lose theirjobs).
15. See Sharon Begley & Martha Brant, You Must Remember This, NEWsWEEF, Sept 26, 1994
at 69 (describing problems of recovered memories, including the possibilities ofjal time for the
accused).
16. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
17. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
18. In this paper, the term therapist will be used to refer to psychologists, psychiatrists, so-
cial workers, and others in the field of mental health therapy.
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I. CAN MEMORIES BE REPRESSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY RECOVERED?
A. Who Reports Recovering Memories?
Reports of recovered memories are usually made by women, 9 of-
ten in the context of therapyu for problems such as anxiety, depres-
sion and sexual dysfunction.2' This disproportionate effect on
women may occur because recalled memories often involve child-
hood incest,2 which claims more female victims than male.2 Addi-
tionally, studies have found that more women than men seek ther-
apy.24 These two factors may result in women reporting recovered
memories of sexual abuse more frequently than men since most
memories are recovered in therapy.
Survivors of childhood incest often exhibit common problems in
adulthood, including an inability to develop meaning-
ful relationshipsas abuse of drugs or alcohol, 26 attempted suicide,2
19. SeeKeith Russell Ablow, Pacovere Memories: Fact orFantasy? Controversy OverDelayed Recall
of SexualAbuse WASIL POST, June 22, 1995, at Z7; see also Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5,
at 9.
20. See Meyer, supra note 1, at DI (describing memories recovered during therapy); but see
Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 607-08 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that the plaintiff's
memories of sexual contact with her teacher were triggered by a documentary on television
about sex between students and teachers).
21. SeeLoftms, supra note 3. at 523 (discussing the connection drawn between current prob-
lems and allegations of past sexual abuse).
22. Cf Loftus, supra note 3, at 523 (stating that in addition to incest, recalled memories
include torture by drugs, electric shock, rape, sodomy, forced oral sex, and ritualistic killing of
babies born to, or aborted by the patients); Henry Chu, Suit Claiming Satanic Abuse Nearing the
Jury, L. TI ES, April 11, 1991, at B7 (stating that two middle-aged sisters, both in therapy
separately for multiple personality disorder, but with the same therapist, sued their mother after
they allegedly recovered memories of their mother forcing them, since infancy, to participate in
satanic rituals. Thejury awarded nominal damages for negligent child rearing.); see alsoJames
S. Gordon, The UFO Experiene, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1991, at 82-92 (stating that a woman
recalled through hypnosis that she was abducted by aliens on an exotic spacecraft).
23. Maryann McCabe, Dynamics of Childhood SexualAbuse, in SEXUAL ABUSE OF C-ILDREN 5
(Ronald E. Cohen & Maryann McCabe eds., 1986) (stating that in a survey of 145 incest cases,
86% of the victims were female and 14% were male); see alsoJ umT- L wVS H MN, FATHER-
DAUGH R INCEST 83 (1981) (estimating that in 80% of incest cases, the contact began before
the daughter reached the age of 13, with the average age being nine).
24. Walter R. Grove & Jeannette F. Tudor, Adult Sex Roles and Mental Illness, 78 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 812, 823 (1973); but see Denise LeBoeuf, Note, Pgychiatric Maiprati Exploitation of
WVomenPatients, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 83 (1988) (citing Mary Weisensee, Women'sHealth.Penp-
tions in a Male-Dominated Medical World, in WOMEN IN HEALTH AND ILLNESS: LIM EXPERIENCES
AND CSM 19, 22 (Diane Kjervik & Ida Marie Martinson eds., 1986)) (explaining that the Grove
study did not include alcoholism, personality disorders, and acting-out behaviors, which are
typically male patterns).
25. Ann Marie Hagen, Note, Tolling the Statute of Limitations forAdult Survivors of Childhood
SexualAbuse, 76 IOWAL. REV. 355,358 (1991) (citing LEIMS HERMN, supranote 28, at 83.
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and prostitution.2 1 The existence of these problems, however, is not
necessarily indicative of childhood sexual abuseY It is possible that
a therapist's inappropriate linkage between sexual abuse and a
common symptom thereof may produce "false" recovered memories.
When a patient goes to a therapist for treatment of symptoms as-
sociated with sexual abuse, the therapist may suspect a history of
childhood incestH The therapist may begin looking for other signs
of sexual abuse, even in patients who do not remember afiy such in-
stances."' This search may be dangerously suggestive to the patient
and lead to the formation of false memories.
B. Memories May Be Repressed and Later Recovered
Some modem therapists and researchers believe that incest is such
a traumatic event that it may cause victims to repress memories of
26. DAVID FINKEEOR, A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUsE 162 (1986) (estimating
that 21% of all sexual abuse victims are addicted to drugs and 27% have a history of alcohol
abuse); IvIS HERMAN, supra note 23, at 162 (estimating that 20% of sexual abuse victims abuse
drugs or alcohol).
27. LMVIS HERMAN, supra note 23, at 99 (estimating that 40% of all incest victims attempt
suicide); FINKELHOR, supra note 26, at 154 (estimating that 16% of all incest victims attempt
suicide).
28. Hagen, supra note 25, at 382 n.40; see also LEONARD KARP & CHERYL KARP, DOMESTIC
TORTS: FAMILYVIOLENCE, CONFucT AND SEXUAL ABUSE 216 (1989) (stating that many factors
influence problems faced by incest survivors, including the age of first sexual contact, "the fre-
quency and duration of the abuse, the type of sexual conduct, and the violent or sadistic nature
of the conduct").
29. See MacNamara, supra note 4, at 36 (suggesting that a diagnosis of repressed memory
based on symptoms such as depression, sexual dysfunction and eating disorders is risky because
patients and their accused abusers are filing lawsuits against therapists for negligent diagnoses).
30. See Loftus, supra note 3, at 526 (explaining the tendency among therapists to diagnose
childhood abuse based on generalized symptoms).
31. SeeBegley & Brant, supra note 15, at 68-9 (stating that some therapists will tell a patient
who has no memories of incest to imagine being sexually abused, in an attempt to find the
"truth").
32. See Loftus, supra note 3, at 526 (describing some therapists' aggressive approaches in
uncovering memories of suspected sexual abuse).
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such abuse."3 Factors that may trigger repression include child abus-
ers' demands for secrecy and the abuser's often authoritative posi-
tion of father, uncle, or family friend When victims do report
abuse they are often not believed, 5 or may later retract the state-
ments in order to return the family unit to its previous state.3 7 Some
mental health professionals believe that the shock of the event forces
the memory into an inaccessible area in the unconscious, which is
only later accessible through therapyfs These therapists further be-
lieve that sex abuse victims sometimes experience Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, another explanation for memory repression?'
Therapists who treat victims of childhood sexual abuse often rec-
ommend the book The Courage to Healo to patients. Sometimes re-
ferred to as the "bible of the incest survivors movement,"4 The Cour-
age to Heal is a self-help book for victims of childhood sexual abuse
and has been blamed for encouraging women to recall childhood
33. See Gary M. Ernsdorff and Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let SleepingMemoresLie? Words of Caution
About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memoy Represion, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRiINOLOGY
129 (1993) (discussing the link between trauma and memory repression). The theory of recall-
ing memories is often attributed to Sigmund Freud. Freud, however, later recanted his belief in
recovered memories. See also E. SUE BLUME, SECRET SURVIVORS: UNCOVERING INCEST AND ITS
AFrEREmacrs INWoMEN 81 (1990) (suggesting that half of all incest survivors do not remember
the abuse); Victor Barall, Book Review: Thanks for the Memores: Ciminal Law and the Psychology of
Memory, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1472, 1477-78 (1994);Judith Herman and Emily Schatio, Recover and
Venfat ion of Childhood Sexual Trauma; 4 PSYCHOANALYIIC PSYCHOL 1, 2-5 (1987). But see Loftus,
supra note 3, at 521-22 (stating that although 18% to 59% of patients who were sexually abused
as children stated there was a point when they did not remember their abuse, these statistics
should be treated with caution because affirmative answers do not necessarily mean that the
memories were repressed; it could mean that the pain from the abuse was too great for the pa-
tient to think about it.).
34. SANDRA BUtnR, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: THE TIAUMA OF INCEST 32-33 (1978); Mac-
Namaxa, supra note 4, at 39.
35. KARP &KARP, supra note 28, at 154.
36. KARP &K ARP, supra note 28, at 154 (stating that because children are often not be-
lieved, many cases go unreported).
37. Hagen, supra note 25, at n.46; Roland C. Summit, The Child SexualAbuse Accammodation
Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 177,188 (1983).
38. Christine A. Courtois & Judith E. Sprei, Retrospective Incest Therapy for Women, in
HANDBOOKON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 270, 276 (Leonore E. Auerbach Walker ed., 1988)
(discussing how therapy combined with certain life events, such as the birth of a child, may trig-
ger memories). But see McNamara, supra note 4, at 36 (describing the American Medical Asso-
ciation's conclusion that "recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse [are] ... of uncertain
authenticity").
39. See Courtois & Sprei, supra note 38, at 281-82 (discussing how the recognition of Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder facilitates healing).
40. ELLEN BASS & LAUPA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL: A GUIDE FOR WOMEN SURVIVORS
OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 21 (1988) (stating that "if you are unable to remember any specific
instances... but still have a feeling that something abusive happened to you, it probably did").
41. Christina Bannon, Comment, Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Should the
Courts Getlnvolved When Mental HealthProfesonalsDisagree?, 26 ARiz. ST. L.J. 835, 838 (1994).
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sexual abuse even when no such memories actually exist.4
C. Recovered Memories May Be False Memories
Not all experts agree that painful memories can be repressed and
subsequently recovered.4 Some claim that reports of recovered
memories are actually false.4 One commonly cited example of a
false memory involved Jean Piaget. For years Piaget "remembered"
that someone had tried to kidnap him and he was saved by his
nurse.4 Over a decade after the alleged incident, however, Piaget's
nurse told him that she had lied about the event, and after Piaget's
parents gave her a gold watch as a reward for saving him, she did not
want to recant her story. Piaget may have formed his "memory"
from hearing the nurse talk about the alleged event.
47
Many studies also suggest that it is possible to implant false memo-
ries.4 For instance, a psychologist falsely told Paul Ingram, who was
on trial for child abuse, that Ingram's children claimed that they
were forced to have sex with each other, in front of Ingram.4 9 Al-
though Ingram at first did not recall such crimes, with the "help" of
42. See id. (stating that even ifa woman does not have memories of childhood sexual abuse,
it probably happened); see alsoBLUME, supra note 33, at xiv, xvi (proposing a checklist for incest
survivors and explaining that as many as half of all incest survivors may not remember that the
abuse occurred).
43. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIEs,
MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD ABUSE (1994), repinted in FMS FOUND. NEvSL (False Memory Syn-
drome Found., Phila., Pa.) July 6, 1994, at 10 (stating that while some therapists believe that
memories cannot be repressed at all, others think some recovered memories are true, while
some are false, and still others strongly feel that true memories can be recovered in therapy);
Begley & Brant, supra note 15, at 69 (explaining that experiments suggest that sometimes events
are not recorded in the brain and therefore cannot be remembered or hypnotically recovered
later or that traumatic events are often distorted, but not entirely repressed).
44. See Loftus, supra note 3, at 519. Loftus tells a story of a woman who allegedly recalled
memories ofwitnessing her father kill her best friend. Loftus believes that the woman's memo-
ries are questionable, however, because the events remembered had been in newspapers and
the woman changed many 'memories' as she retold her story. For instance, after being re-
minded that the murdered girl was not missing until after lunch, gie woman insisted that the
murder took place late in the afternoon. Such inconsistencies suggest that some of the
woman's memories may have been false.
45. Loftus, supra note S, at531.
46. Loftus, supra note 3, at 531.
47. Loftus, supra note 3, at 531. But cf MacNamara, supra note 4, at 39 (describing the case
of Brown University professor Ross Cheit, in which a recovered memory appears to have been
real. Cheit allegedly recovered memories of a former camp administrator molesting him.
Three witnesses supported Cheit's allegations and Cheit produced a confession signed by the
accused administrator).
48. See, e.g., Begley & Brant, supra note 15, at 68, 69 (citing Elizabeth Loftus' study in which
people "remembered" being lost in the mall after the experience was suggested to them).
49. Loftus, supra note 3, at 532-33.
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the psychologist, Ingram eventually "remembered" the fictitious
event!0 In another examle, in 1993, a woman recalled being sexu-
ally abused by her father5 After ceasing therapy and her use of psy-
chotropic drugs, however, the woman recanted her accusations!
2
One explanation for the formation of false memories is the man-
ner in which memories are stored. Different aspects of an experi-
ence are stored in different parts of the brain and when something is
'remembered,' these parts are brought together againY In the
process of recreating a memory, it is possible to attach segments of
two different memories to one another, thus creating a false mem-
ory! 4 Some false memories may also be induced by therapists in-
forming patients that certain symptoms indicate abuse and aggres-
sively helping patients to "remember" such events."
Il. SHOULD UNVERIFIED PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES BE USED TO
DETERMINE A PARTY'S FATE IN THE COURTROOM?
As a means of coming to terms with their abuse, victims often seek
therapy, confront the abuser, or seek to bring the abuser to justice in
a court of law!5 Legal action can serve to empower the victim, com-
pensate for the harm that was caused, deter future abuse, pay for
50. Loftus, supra note 3, at 533 (describing the Paul Ingram case. Ingrain initially denied
charges when arrested for child abuse but, after five months of interrogations and psychological
sessions he began reporting memories of sexually abusing children and participating in a satan-
worshipping cultwhich was alleged to have murdered 25 babies).
51. Meyer, supranote 1, atDl.
52. Meyer, supra note 1, at D1, D4.
53. Smee Begley & Brant, supra note 15, at 68 (explaining that the brain's limbic system pulls
together bits of memory from different parts of the brain).
54. Se Begley 8 Brant, supra note 15, at 68 (providing an example of how someone can
recall running a stop sign and later connect that memory with other memories of stop signs); see
also George I. Ganaway, Historical Versu Narrative Truth: Clarfying the Role of Exogenous Trauma in
theE iology ofMPD and its Variants, 2 DISsOCrAT7ON 205-20 (1989) (stating that internal sources of
fhise memories include fantasizing about sexual abuse to protect oneself from more painful
memories, while external sources include movies, books and therapists); MacNamara, supra note
4, at 38 (citing ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL: A GUIDE FOR WOMEN
SURVIVORS OF CHILD ABUSE (1988)) (crediting the book, THE COURAGE TO HEAL, with encour-
aging women to come forward with stories of childhood abuse).
55. See Loftus, supra note 3, at 526-27 (providing examples of therapists who tell patients
that it is likely that the patient was sexually abused, or involved in satanic rituals as a child).
Loftus also cites case histories of patients who thought that itwas possible they were abused, and
were subsequently told by their therapist that if the patient thought it was a possibility, then it
was probably true.
56. Begley & Brant, supra note 15, at 69 (citing the False Memory Syndrome Foundation's
estimate that 700 civil and criminal cases have been filed based on recovered memories of
childhood abuse).
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therapy, and place blame on the abuser 57  Controversy over the ve-
racity of recovered memories, however, should cause courts to hesi-
tate before relying solely on evidence of recovered memories.
A. The Rise of the Discovey Rule
Repressed memories create a unique problem when calculating
statutes of limitations. In most sexual abuse cases, the statute of
limitations is tolled until the age of majority, after which a victim has
only one to three years in which to file a civil suit' This rule prohib-
its recovery for victims who may not recall their abuse until years af-
ter reaching majority. Therefore, supporters of repressed memory
theory have urged courts to apply the discovery rule to cases where
victims allegedly recover memories of childhood sexual abuse 9 By
using the discovery rule, victims have the advantage of tolling the
statute of limitations until they know, or through the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence, should know, of the abuse and injuries resulting
from the abuse.6
Once a court decides to apply the discovery rule, two factors influ-
ence how the rule is applied. First, the court examines the extent to
which elements of the cause of action were repressed 1  Second, a
judge determines whether corroborating evidence is available. Most
jurisdictions that accept the discovery rule limit its application to
plaintiffs who have no recollection of past sexual abuse until shortly
57. See Hagen, supra note 25, at 363 n.53, 56 (citing Margaret J. Allen, Comment, Tort
Remdies For IncestuousAbuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 609 (1983)) (describing the benefits a
victim derives by suing her abuser); see also Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980)
(stating that punitive damages against a father for abuse of his daughter are meant to punish
him and warn others not to engage in the same behavior). But see MacNamara, supra note 4, at
86 (quoting Bill Craig, a Los Angeles defense lawyer, who suggests that suing an alleged abuser
can be harmful and break apart a family, regardless of the truth of the accusations. To avoid
the strain of litigation, Craig suggests solving the problem through a mediator.).
58. Hagen, supra note 25, at 355 n.2 (citing examples of state statutes of limitations and
noting that the statute of limitations period will depend upon the cause of action. For the most
common causes of action, such as assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, the statute of limitations is one to three years.).
59. See Hagen, supra note 25, at 356 (arguing that adults who were sexually abused as chil-
dren should be able to use the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations).
60. Hagen, supra note 25, at 355 n.3. The most prevalent use of this rule to toll the statute
of limitations has been in latent disease cases arising from product liability actions. So Uric v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (holding, for the first time, that the statute of limitations is
tolled for a plaintiff until he or she is diagnosed with a disease, rather than running from the
time the disease was contracted); Francis E. McGovern, Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statute
of Repose in Product Liabiffty Actions: Present and Future; 16 FORUMI 416, 424 (1981) (noting that
some states begin tolling the statute of limitations on discovery of latent injury).
61. See infra note 62 (citing cases in which all memories of past abuse were repressed); note
63 (citing cases in which the injury was not recognized).
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before they file suit.62  Some jurisdictions toll the statute of limita-
tions only until the injury is discovered, whether or not the acts
which caused the injury are known. 3 Often, courts will limit use of
62. Doe v. Roe, 1996 WL 445314 (Ariz. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff did not "discover
she was abused until two years before filing suit, thereby bypassing the statute of limitations");
Peterson v. Huso, 1996 WL 411851 (N.D. 1996) (holding that the discovery rule tolls the statute
of limitations until a sex-abuse victim discovers the abuse); Hagen, supra note 25, at 866; see, ag.
Mary D. v.John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) review granted and opinion superseded,
788 P.2d 155 (Cal. 1990), review dismissed, cause remanded, 800 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1990) (allowing use
of the discovery rule when there is no memory of sexual abuse until after the statute of limita-
tions has run);Johnson v.Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1863 (N.D. Ili. 1988) (holding that the discov-
ery rule is applicable where the plaintiff had no knowledge of the abuse until shortly before she
filed suit and suggesting that it would not be applicable in cases where the plaintiff had remem-
bered the abuse previously, even if all injuries stemming from the abuse were not known); Ault
v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994) (applying the discovery rule where a woman allegedly re-
pressed memories of incest until the age of 28 and then filed suit within a year of discovering
the abuse); see also Schwestka v. Hocevar, 1994 WL 224390 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 1994) (holding
that the discovery rule was not appropriate and the suit time-barred when a 35 year-old plaintiff
was consistently aware of sexual abuse that occurred between the ages of 6 and 16, and was
aware of the wrongfulness of these acts from an early age); Marsha v. Gardner, 281 Cal. Rptr.
473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the discovery rule could not be used to toll the statute of
limitations when facts essential to the cause of action were discovered before the statute of limi-
tations had run. Although the plaintiff was sexually abused between the ages of 8 and 17 and
had not repressed these memories, she claimed that she was unaware of additional, psychologi-
cal harm until after the statute of limitations had run. The court held that this additional harm
only created uncertainty as to the amount of damages and was, therefore, notan element of the
cause of action.); E.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817 (Mo. 1988) (holding that the statute of limita-
tions was not tolled by the discovery rule in a case where a child sued her step-uncle for prior
sexual abuse because the plaintiff had continuous memories of the abuse); Bowser v. Gutten-
dorf, 541 A.2d 377 (Pa. 1988) (holding that the discovery rule was not appropriate where the
plaintiff should have known of the injury when it occurred); Raymond v. Ingram, 737 P.2d 314
(Wash. CL App. 1987), review denieA, 108 Wash.2d 1031 (1987) (holding that the discovery rule
could not apply when the plaintiff consistently remembered abuse from her grandfather be-
tween the ages of 4 and 17, even though she did not realize the extent of the psychological in-
juries until shortly before filing suit. The holding 'was superseded by WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.16.340(2)) (West 1995).
63. See, eg., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (extending the dis-
covery rule to a case where the plaintiff engaged in a sexual relationship with her Indian Health
Services counselor and wvas fully aware that the relationship had taken place, but did not con-
nect her injuries to the relationship until after the statute of limitations had run); Hammer v.
Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 428 N.W.2d 552 (Wis. 1988)
(allowing use of the discovery rule when a plaintiff was aware of the abuse at the time it oc-
curred, but the causal connection between the abuse and the plaintiff's injuries was not recog-
nized). The court stated that the "injustice of barring meritorious claims before the claimant
knows of the injury outweighs the threat of stale or fraudulent actions." I& at 27 (quoting Han-
sen v. Pritt. Robins Co., 335 N.W.2d 578 (Wis. 1983)). But cf Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr.
605 (Cal. CL App. 1990) (instructing the trial court on remand that the discovery rule can be
used to toll the statute of limitations only where the plaintiff repressed memories of the abuse
and not where she is simply unaware of the full extent of her injuries); DeRose v. Carswell, 242
Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding, in the leading case in California, that the plaintiff
could not use the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations when she brought suit against
her step-grandfather for sexually abusing her as a child. At the time of the abuse, the plaintiff
vras aware that it was causing her harm. She alleged, however, that she was not aware of the
connection between her present injuries and the abuse until shortly before she filed suit. The
court held that the discovery rule only applies when all of the facts essential to the cause of ac-
tion are not discovered. This holding vas superseded by CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340 (West
1995).
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the discovery rule to situations where corroborating evidence is avail-
able.' Other states toll the statute of limitations using a disability
statute, which tolls the statue until a disability, such as a repressed
memory, is discovered.6s The recent trend is for courts to be more
wary of recovered memories and to refuse to apply the discovery rule
to these situations.&
The Supreme Court has stated that public policy often dictates
strict application of statutes of limitation to insure fairness to defen-
dants, to safeguard against stale claims, and to protect the rights of
64. See, e.g., Nicolette v. Carey, 751 F. Supp. 695, 699 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (requiring cor-
roboration that a sexual assault occurred); Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that the statute of limitations could be tolled under the insanity clause un-
til one year after the plaintiff recovered memories of sexual contact with her teacher, but only
where there was also corroborative evidence); Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990)
(allowing use of the discovery rule where there was clear and convincing evidence that abuse
occurred); Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989) (applying the discovery rule when a
22 year old woman sued her father for assault and battery in the form of sexual abuse where
evidence supported the claim of abuse); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993) (holding
that the plaintiff was required to show corroborating evidence to support her allegations of sex-
ual abuse and extend the statute of limitations); see also AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD ABUSE, rerinted in,
FMS FOUND. NEVSL (False Memory Found., Phila., Pa.) July 6, 1994, at 10 (suggesting that the
AMA's policy should be changed to say that the AMA considers "recovered memories of child-
hood sexual abuse to be of uncertain authenticity, which should be subject to external verifica-
tion. The use of recovered memories is fraught with problems of potential misapplication.");
Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 229 (Wash. 1986) (holding that the discovery rule should not be
applied when a 27 year-old plaintiff alleged sexual abuse occurred between the ages of three
and eleven because there was "no empirical, verifiable evidence ... of the occurrences and re-
sulting harm which [the] plaintiff allege[d])." Tyson was superseded by the WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.16.340(2) (West 1995). But see Johnson v.Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1369 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (holding that the discovery rule should not depend on whether objective evidence is pre-
sent because such evidence is only one factor).
65. See, e.g., MersPost, 427 N.W.2d at 606; cf Kelly v. Marcantonia, 1996 WL 389136 (RI.
1996) (holding that whether a repressed memory constitutes an "unsound mind" to toll the
statute of limitations is a question of law for the trialjudge to decide);Jones v.Jones, 576 A.2d
316 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1990), cet deni-A 585 A.2d 412 (N.J. 1990) (stating that mental trauma re-
sulting from sexual abuse by a relative may be regarded as an "insanity" disability so as to toll the
statute of limitations). But see Peterson v. Huso, 1996 WL 411851 (N.D. 1996) (holding that re-
pressed memories cannot be considered to be a disability because it is not listed as such in the
appropriate statute); Ermstes v. Warner, 860 F. Supp. 1838 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (holding that re-
pressed memories are not a disability that tolls the statute of limitations).
66. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995); Lindabury v.
Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1117-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), cause dismised, 560 So. 2d 233
(Fla. 1990) (holding that the discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations under Florida
law where a daughter sued her parents for sexual battery); Lemmerman v. Fealk, 584 N.W.2d
695 (Mich. 1995) (holding that neither the discovery rule nor the grace period which tolls the
statute of limitations for persons who are insane, tolls the statute of limitations for persons who
repress memories); Doe v. Maskell, 1996 WL 426528 (Md. 1996) (holding, in a unanimous deci-
sion, that the mere presence of repressed memories is insufficient to trigger application of the
discovery rule); Pearce v. Salvation Army, 674 A.2d 1123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that the
discovery rule does not toll the statute of limitations in cases of repressed memories); S.V. v.
R.V., 39 Tex. Sup. Ct.J. 386 (Mar. 14, 1996) (holding that the discovery rule does not apply to
cases of repressed memories).
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diligent plaintiffs. 67 .Some states are reluctant to extend the statute of
limitations for litigants proceeding with claims based on repressed
memories for the foregoing reasons and because these states believe
therapy is an unreliable means of discovering past sexual abuse.6s
Application of the discovery rule challenges a defendant to prove
his innocence, years, and sometimes even decades, after the alleged
events. However, time also works against the plaintiff's search for
evidence,69 especially since plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that
the abuse occurred." Hearsay and exclusionary rules prohibit evi-
dence that is unreliable or may create a substantial danger of undue
prejudice, from reaching the jury.' These evidentiary safeguards
provide further protection to the defendant. From a policy stand-
point, this protection of the abuser at the expense of the victim may
be considered an "intolerable perversion of justice."7 Thus, courts
often use a balancing approach to determine when the statute of
limitations should be tolled, weighing the dangers of allowing stale
claims against barring a victim's recovery.7'
State legislatures have also responded to concerns about child-
hood sexual abuse by passing legislation requiring that the discovery
rule be applied to cases of childhood sexual abuse. In some states,
the statute of limitations must be tolled until the plaintiff knew, or
67. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); see also Denise Rose, Comment,
Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long Term Dam-
ages, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 191, 216-217 (1985) (suggesting that the argument of giving de-
fendants repose is not applicable in incest cases, but problems of stale evidence and faded
memories are applicable); cf Travis v. Ziter, 1996 WL 390629 (Ala.July 12, 1996) (holding that
repressing memories is not the equivalent of being insane and it will not toll the statute of limi-
tations).
68. Se Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 227-229 (Wash. 1986) (stating that the truth of recov-
ered memories cannot be objectively ascertained, therefore, the discovery rule should not ap-
ply).
69. Kubrik 444 U.S. at 117.
70. S supra note 64 (citing cases in which courts require pIaintiffs to produce corroborat-
ing proof that abuse occurred).
71. Hagen, supranote 25, at 375.
'72. Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 27 (WIs. Ct. App. 1987), reew denied 428 N.W.2d
552 (Wi s. 1988) (citing Comment, Tort Remeiesfor Inwstums Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
609, 631 (1983)).
73. Hagen, supra note 25, at 374; see alsoJohnson v.Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1369 (N.D.
IIl. 1988) (stating that the Illinois Supreme Court utilizes a caseby-case approach to applying
the discovery rule, taking into account equitable considerations as strongly as it takes into ac-
count problems of proof).
Fall 1996] 219
220 JOURNAL OF GENDER& THE LAW [Vol. 5:207
should have known, that the injury was caused by the abuse.7*
B. Should Novel Scientific Techniques and Theories Be Admitted as
Evidence?
If a claim fals within the statute of limitations, the next issue is
whether evidence of recovered memories will be allowed in the
courtroom. Science should be used as much as possible to validate
evidence. Judges, however, must use care when determining which
evidence to admit as juries tend to overvalue scientific evidence when
it is presented by an expert."' Juries may also face difficulty in accu-
rately determining the validity of scientific evidence.75
In cases brought years after the acts in question took place, evi-
dence is often difficult to obtain or substantiate.7 Often the pri-
74. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 (1994) (allowing the plaintiff to bring a suit within three
years after the plaintiff discovered or through reasonable diligence should have discovered that
the act caused the injury); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing the plain-
tiff to bring suit within three years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discov-
ered that the illness or injury occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual
abuse); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-523 (1994) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within three years
after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or illness was
caused by childhood sexual abuse); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 4C (West Supp. 1996)
(allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within three years after the victim discovered or reasonably
should have discovered that an emotional or psychological injury was caused by the sexual
abuse); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West Supp. 1995) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within
six years after the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the sexual
abuse); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.046 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within
three years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or
illness was caused by child sexual abuse); MONT. CODEANN. § 27-2-216 (1995) (allowing a plain-
tiff to bring suit within three years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discov-
ered that the injury was caused by the act of childhood sexual abuse); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.215
(1995) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within ten years after the plaintiff discovers or reasona-
bly should have discovered that the injury was caused by sexual abuse); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:61B-1 (West Supp. 1995) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within two years after the reason-
able discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the act of sexual abuse); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within two years after the
victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by the sexual
abuse); M.L GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51 (Michie Supp. 1995) (allowing a plaintiff to bring a suit within
seven years after the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was
caused by the sexual abuse); S.D. CODINIED AWs ANN. § 26-10-25 (1992) (allowing a plaintiff to
bring suit within three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discov-
ered that the injury was caused by sexual abuse); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522 (Supp. 1994)
(allowing a plaintiff to bring suit within six years of the time the victim discovered that the in-
jury was caused by the act); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing a
plaintiff to bring suit within three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should
have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by the act).
75. John E.B. Myers, .pert Testimony Describing Psydiological Syndromes, 24 PAC. LJ. 1449,
1462 (1993) (cting People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240,1245 (Cal. 1976)).
76. Myers, supra note 75, at 1462.
77. See Kurn-k, 444 U.S. at 117 (stating that with old caims, "the search for truth may be
seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fad-
ing memories, disappearance of documents, or othenvise").
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mary, if not the only evidence available in cases of repressed memo-
ries of childhood incest is the "recovered" memories of the patient.78
This problem is sometimes further complicated by the use of tech-
niques such as hypnosis" and sodium amytal therapy,8 that are used
to help the patient recall past events. The statements made by pa-
tients undergoing these therapeutic techniques is of questionable
validity.s1
1. Controversial Techniques Used to Revive Memories
a) Hypnosis
If testimony based on repressed memories is admissible, it is nec-
essary to analyze the techniques used to help recover the memories.
Hypnosis is sometimes used to refresh patients' memoriess but its
use in psychotherapy is often debated.0 Often, a hypnotized patient
experiences an increase in both accurate and inaccurate recollec-
78. Jacqueline Hough, Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Applying the Daubert
Standard in State Courts, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 855, 855 (1995) (stating that in many cases, recovered
memories are the only evidence being brought to court).
79. Rola S. Vamini, Note, Repressed and Recovered Memories of Child Sexual Abuse The Accued
as a "Dired Victim, "47 HASTINGS LJ. 551, 562 (1992) (explaining that many patients claim their
therapists "planted" memories during hypnosis).
80. Id. (defining sodium amytal as a "truth serum" which is often used to induce memories
that many patients later believe are Ualse).
81. Se4 eg., Dad Wins SuitAgainst Daughter's Therapis4 PSYCHIATRIC NEwSJune 3, 1994, at 19
(describing a case in which Gary Ramona, a father who was accused of sexually abusing his
daughter, sued his daughter's therapist claiming that sodium amytal was improperly used in im-
planting memories); Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials, 45
VAND. L.REV. 1185 (1992) (discussing the use of hypnosis to recover memories).
82. Se Kanovitz, supra note 81, at 1212 (stating that therapists specializing in childhood
sexual abuse often use hypnosis to obtain results in less time and at less cost than traditional
therapy) (citing Thruman Mott, Jr., The Role of H)pnosis in Ps'chotherapy, 24 AM. J. CLINICAL
HI'PNOSIS 241, 244-46 (1982) (citations omitted)).
83. See Kanovitz, supra note 81, at 1212 (asserting that although clinicians use hypnosis to
improve memory, researchers generally do not believe that hypnosis can achieve such goals)
(citing American Medical Ass'n Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientipc Status ofRefteshingRecole.
tio by the Use of Hpnosis, 34INT'LJ. CLINICAL & EXPERBIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 1, 1 (1986)). Kanovitz
claims that this difference can be explained by the fact that clinical hypnotists work with pa-
tients who have repressed traumatic memories, while researchers work with 'normal' patients,
who may not have strong, hidden memories. This, she claims explains why no memories are
'recovered' in normal individuals. Kanovitz, supra note 81, at 1213.
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tions.ss Scientists speculate that this phenomenon occurs because
subjects become vulnerable to suggestion and try to please the hyp-
notist.s A hypnotized patient may fabricate memories or try to fill in
gaps between known memories. 6 Furthermore, "memory harden-
ing" may occur with hypnosis, 7 causing a patient to become confi-
dent in the "truth" of both true and false memories.88 Sorting accu-
rate from inaccurate memories becomes impossible for both
professionals trained in hypnosis and the patients themselves.89
Hypnosis is used for two distinct purposes. Therapeutically, it can
help patients come to terms with their past and thus help relieve
present problems. Forensically,5 it can provide evidence for civil or
criminal trials.9' In therapeutic sessions, the purpose of hypnosis is
not to discover the truth of past events, but rather to discover the pa-
tient's perceptions of past events to determine how past events influ-
ence present life.92 Hypnosis is also used to strengthen the relation-
84. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1503-04 (D. Conn. 1994), af/'d 68 F.3d 597 (2d
Cir. 1995), cert. deni e 1165 S. Ct. 1869 (1996) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 58-60
(1987)); see also Martin T. Ome, Wayne G. Whitehouse, David F. Dinges, and Emily Carota
Orne, Reconstructing Memoy Thraugk Hpnosis: Frensic and Clinical Implctions, in HiYNOSMs AND
MEMORY 21, 34-44 (Helen M. Pettinati ed., 1988) (summarizing studies which found that sub-jects of hypnosis recall more correct and incorrect information and that subjects are more con-
fident in the accuracy of memories recalled during hypnosis than during a waking state); Kano-
vitz, supra note 81, at 1229-34 (stating that during a traumatic event such as a car crash,
recovered memories may be less reliable because the images may never have been fully formed.
Sexual abuse, however, especially by a friend or relative, is likely to produce a clear memory and
be recovered correctly.).
85. See Kanovitz, supra note 81, at 1230-31 and n.191 (stating that patients sometimes add
details in response to a hypnotist's suggestion and listing sources that question the reliability of
hypnotically revived memories).
86. Se Kanovitz, supra note 81, at 1231 (asserting that patients frequently substitute a hyp-
notist's suggestions for their own recollection or add the suggested details to their own memo-
ries).
87. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 60 (explaining that memory hardening occurs when a subject has
confidence in both true and false memories).
88. Borawick, 842 F. Supp. at 1504 (dting Rock, 483 U.S. at 58-60); see also United States v.
Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1202 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denkAd, 502 U.S. 1101 (1992) (describing how a
witness becomes convinced that statements made under hypnosis are true).
89. Valde;z 722 F.2d at 1202. But see Rock, 483 U.S. at 61 (stating that the jury can be edu-
cated to the limitations of hypnosis); Kanovitz, supra note 81, at 127 n.137 (explaining that a
patient's desire to please her therapist may make her susceptible to suggestion in regular ther-
apy sessionsjust as in hypnosis sessions).
90. CfBLACK'SLAvDIarIONARY 649 (6th ed. 1990) (defining forensic psychiatry as, "Etihat
branch of medicine dealing with disorders of the mind in relation to legal principles and
cases").
91. Kanovitz, supra note 81, at 1218.
92. Kanovitz, supra note 81, at 1218 n.140 (citing DONALD P. SPENCE, NARRATIVE TRUTH
AND HIrTORICAL TRUTM MEANING AND INTERPRETATION IN PSYCHoANALYSMS 21-33, 175-214
(1982)).
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ship between the therapist and patient93 Although a strong thera-
pist/patient relationship is generally beneficial, it may run the risk of
eliciting false information if the patient tries to please the therapist?9
For instance, if a patient believes that a therapist is searching for
childhood sexual abuse, then pleasing the therapist could lead to
the creation of false memories."
Unlike therapeutic hypnosis, the primary goal of forensic hypnosis
is to discover the truth. Certain procedures can be followed which
increase the likelihood that statements made while under hypnosis
may be admitted as evidence 7 For instance, accuracy of statements
made during hypnosis can be increased by refraining from use of
leading questions and not allowing the patient to know the thera-
pist's expectations!"
The American Medical Association recommends guidelines for re-
freshing memories through hypnosis.9 Legally, hypnosis is sug-
gested only when performed forensically and conducted by a trained
psychiatrist or psychologist aware of the legal implications of the
procedure °0 A taped or written record of the patient's knowledge of
the case prior to hypnosis is also suggested.' Additionally, the en-
tire hypnotic therapy session, including the pre-hypnosis interview,
the hypnosis itself and the post-hypnosis interview should be video-
taped. 2
Courts deal with hypnotic evidence in three ways. Some state
courts consider a witness who has undergone hypnosis to be incom-
93. Ranovitz, supra note 81, at 1212.
94. Hanovitz, supra note 81, at 1218 (stating that the intensity of the bond between dini-
dan and patient runs a risk of "overstepping the bounds of interview neutrality").
95. SeeKanovitz, supra note 81, at 1219 (stating that leading questions are often asked dur-
ing therapeutic hypnosis).
96. Kanovitz, supra note 81, at 1217-18.
97. Se4 eg., State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 96-97 (N.J. 1981) (listing six procedural require-
ments for admissibility of scientific evidence); Borau*dd 842 F. Supp. at 1504.05 (listing factors
which render more likely the successful introduction of hypnotically induced testimony into evi-
dence).
98. Kanovitz, supra note 81, at 1219.
99. American Medical Ass'n, Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs, CSA Report 5-A-
94, June 16, 1994, Subject Memories of Childhood Abuse [hereinafter AMA Report] (cited in
Yank D. Coble, Jr., Note, 3 (7) FALSE MEMORY SYNDROME FOUNDATION NEWsYrLBT 10-12
(1994)).
100. Id.; see also Hurd, 432 A.2d at 97 (stating that requiring a professional psychologist or
psychiatrist to conduct a hypnotic session may safeguard against misuse of hypnosis).
101. YankD. CobleJr., Note, 3 (7) FAISEMEMorxSYNDRomFoUNDATION NEWSLE= 10-
12 (1994).
102. Id.
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petent per se to testify to any subject discussed while under hypno-
sis.103 Other courts, including some federal courts, leave the question
of competence or credibility for the trier of fact to resolve.'t 4 A third
set of state and federal courts consider a hypnotized witness compe-
tent to testify only if the witness suffered a memory loss potentially
remedied by hypnosis and if safeguards are employed to guard
against suggestion and confabulation.05
The court in Borawick held that safeguards are necessary when
dealing with witnesses who have undergone hypnosis.' To insure a
just trial, the court required that the hypnotist be properly qualified
and avoid adding to the subject's descriptions.' 7 In addition, the
court asked for permanent records and other corroborating evi-
dence.'t The court in Borawick believed that without such safe-
guards, recovered memories should not be used as evidence. 9
b) Sodium Amytal
Sodium amytal, a sedative and hypnotic agent,"0 has been used to
determine whether recovered memories of sexual abuse are true
103. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 57-58 n.14 (citing cases from multiple states, including, Alaska,
Arizona, Florida and Delaware which hold that a per se rule of excluding a criminal defendant's
hypnotically induced testimony was unconstitutional under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors, 771 F.2d 1112, 1120 n.10 (8th Cir. 1985)
(referring to cases in which a court found that hypnotically induced testimony was found to be
inadmissible per se); Borawick, 842 F.Supp. at 1504 (referring to cases in which a witness who has
undergone hypnosis is per se incompetent as to any subject explored while under hypnosis);
Contraras v. Alaska, 718 P.2d 129, 134 (Ala. 1986) (stating that the use of hypnosis fails the Frye
test, and also fails FED. R. EvD. § 403 because hypnotically adduced testimony is more prejudi-
cial than probative).
104. See, e.g;. Spynzynayk, 771 F.2d at 1120 n.9 (listing cases in which courts have admitted
testimony acquired under hypnosis and left credibility assessments to juries); Rine v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., Inc., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that a refreshment of memory
through hypnosis goes to credibility of testimony and not to competence as a witness, and, as
such, is an issue for the trier of fact to assess); Wyllerv. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509-
510 (9th Cir. 1974) (rejecting defendant's arguments that undergoing hypnosis to improve his
limited recollection of events as inherently untrustworthy and concluding that a cautionary in-
struction to the jury regarding hypnosis is appropriate).
105. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 59 n.16 (listing cases in which hypnosis affects credibility and not
just admissibility of testimony and advising courts to conduct individual inquiries in each case);
Borawick, 842 F. Supp. at 1504-05 (listing safeguards required by Hurd); Hurd, 432 A.2d at 86
(holding that a witness' testimony may be credible when safeguards such as use of an experi-
enced psychologist or psychiatrist or recording a witness' pre-hypnosis memories are used); see
also State v. Fertig, 668 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1996) (reaffirming the use of the Hurd factors and re-
jecting the idea that testimony is inadmissible perseifitwas ilcited through hypnosis).
106. Borawick, 842 F. Supp. at 1501.
107. d. at 1505.
108. Id
109. Id.
110. AMADRUGEvALUATIoN 153 (4th ed. 1980).
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memories."' Despite its reputation as a truth serum, there is no
medical or scientific basis for this use; 1 sodium amytal, only relaxes
people.1  In its 1994 review of sodium amytal, the AMA concluded
that this drug has no legitimate use in recovered-memory cases.1 4
Scientists theorize that because patients are told that sodium amytal
acts as a truth serum, some patients may form strong beliefs in the
truth of any statements revealed during therapy115  This process is
similar to memory hardening during hypnosis."' Therefore, memo-
ries developed after sodium amytal therapy should be treated with
caution.
2. Should Recovered Memories be Used as Evidence?
As a result of the controversy surrounding recovered memories,
the law must carefully examine the weight it gives to this type of evi-
dence. The issue usually involves whether to allow expert testimony
based on techniques or theories that are not generally accepted by
the scientific community.
a) From Frye to Daubert
The traditional authority in determining whether expert testimony
based on scientific evidence should be admitted is Frye v. United
States. 17  That court held that expert opinions based on scientific
techniques are only admissible if the technique has "gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.""8 Although in
111. See Ramona v. Isabella, No. C61898 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 13, 1994) (Deposition of the
marriage, famly and child counselor, 54) (recounting an instance in which the victim's psychia-
trist advised the victim that it was impossible to He while under the influence of sodium amytal
and therefore the victim's recovered memories of abuse were true).
112. Id. at 452-56 (analyzing studies of the clinical use of truth serum and its ability to stimu-
late behavior or verbal commentary of past events).
113. August PiperJr. "Truh Serum" and "Revered Memorke" of Sexual Abuse: A Review of the
Evidencej. OFPSYCuAT'Y&IAW 447,449 (Winter 1993).
114. AMA Report, supra note 99.
115. Se4 eg., Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories 48(5) AM. PSVCHOLOGIST
518,526 (1993) [hereinafter TheReality ofRepressedMemores]; Kanovitz, supranote 81, at 1230-31
n.188-90.
116. 7he Realty of Repressed Memories, supra note 115, at 528.
117. 293 F. 1013,1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
118. Rye, 293 F. at 1014 (holding that since a systolic blood pressure deception test, which
was purported to distinguish between truth and lies, was not generally accepted in the psycho.
logical and physiological fields, expert testimony based on these tests could not be used to de-
termine the innocence of a man accused of murder).
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use for over seventy years, the Fye test has many critics."9 One weak-
ness of the "general acceptance" standard is that it may be overly
conservative. 121 It requires that the legal system wait until scientists
accept certain theories or methods, during which time the public
does not have use of this new information. Peter Huber sums up
the critics' views of the conservative nature of Frye by quoting Judge
Sterne, explaining that if standards like Frye had been applied in
other fields, "Christopher Columbus could never have been qualified
as an expert to render an opinion on circumnavigation and the
Wright Brothers would never have been able to testify as experts and
give opinions relating to flight, because their views never gained
'general acceptance in the scientific community. ' ""2
Another weakness of the Fye test is that it is difficult to determine
general acceptance of a scientific theory or technique and to define
the scientific field in which it belongs. How a court defines "general
acceptance" will often determine whether the scientific theory or
method in question will meet the general acceptance standard'23
While it may be useful to allow scientists to decide general accep-
tance of particular techniques, critics argue that scientific decisions
usurp the role ofjudges.124
The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 19 7 5 ,'2' contain several
119. Sep, eg., CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF EVIDENCE 363-64 (1954);
Paul C. Gianelli, The Admissibilify ofNovel Sientifc Evide Frye v. United States a Hal-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1233-4 (1980) (stating that conflicting court decisions interpret-
ing McCormick's requirement of general scientific acceptance as a precondition for admission
of evidence have created confusion).
120. Brief of Amid Curie American Law Professors at 25, Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (No. 92-102).
121. See Giannelli, supra note 119, at 1223 n.202 (citing Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 75
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (stating that "Es]ociety need not tolerate homicide until there devel-
ops abody of medical literature aboutsome particular lethal agent")); United States v. Addison,
498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that although the Frye standard slows the admis.
sion of new scientific discoveries, it is worth the cost because it assures that the validity of new
discoveries is determined by those best able to do so).
122. PrIER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 20 (1991)
.(quoting Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 576 A.2d 4, 15 (N.J. 1990) (Stem, J., concurring))
(analyzing KennethJ. Chesebro, Galileo's ,etort: Pe er Huber's Jun chlarship 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1637 (1993).
123. See People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 744 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that
there was no general acceptance of DNA testing because a debate was published on the issue in
the December, 1991 issue of the journal SCIENCE); Amicus Brief, American Law Professors, supra
note 120, at 26 (suggesting that tea leaf reading is generally acceptable if the relevant field is
tea leaf readers).
124. EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, The Evolution of the American Testfor the Admissibility of Scentlyc
Evidence, 80 MED. SCI. & LAW 60,61 (1990).
125. Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L. No. 93-595
§ 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (Jan. 2, 1975).
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provisions which may change the standard for admitting scientific
evidence.12 6 For example, Rule 702, which governs expert testimony,
does not indicate that "general acceptance" is necessary for scientific
evidence to be admitted.2 7 Rule 702 states that, "[i]f scientific, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge 'will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise."'2a Rule 403 checks the admissibility of scientific evidence by
excluding scientific evidence which, although valid, would cause
prejudice or waste time.'29
Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the court's rul-
ing in Frye was unclear for many years. Both courts and scholars ar-
gued over whether Fye or the new Federal Rules of Evidence should
be followed in court proceedings."5
In 1993, the Supreme Court tried to end this controversy in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,'s' by holding that the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provides the standard for admitting
expert scientific testimony in a federal trial.'s2 The Court rejected
Frye because the "general acceptance" standard was not included in
the Rule's language, nor was any mention of Fye present in the draft-
126. § 1, 88 Stat. at 1930-31 (eg., Rules 104(a) & (b), 105,401, 402) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 63).
127. FED. R. Evma. 702.
128. I.
129. FED. R. ElVID. 403. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Id.
130. Se, eg., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence supersede Fye The court stated that the first two requirements of the
Federal Rules of Evidence 403, probativeness and materiality, are generally not in dispute. The
real test is a balancing between the third requirement, reliability of the evidence, and its poten-
tial negative impact on the jury.); 3 JACKB. WEINsTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WNNSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE Sec. 702[03] at 702, 743-51 (1989) (arguing that the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence did not mention Fyebecause they no longer meant to follow the "general acceptance"
standard); Veronica I. Larvie, Evidence -Admissbilly of Scientific Evidence in Federal Courts-The
Supremne Court Decides Frye is Dead, and the Federal Rules ofEvidence Provide the Standard, But Is There
a Skeleton in the ClosetF Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), 29 LIAND
&WATERL. REV. 275, 281 (1994) (stating that three federal circuits ruled Frye no longer applies,
while six apply the Fye standards); but see Edward J. Imminkelreid, EVEDENTARY FOUNDATIONS,
90-91 (3d ed. 1995) (suggesting that the Fye standard survived the Federal Rules of Evidence
and remains the majority view among state courts).
181. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
132. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (stating that the Frye standard is "absent from and incom-
patible with the Federal Rules of Evidence, [and] should not be applied in federal trials").
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ing history.Iss Since Fryes general acceptance test was the prevailing
standard at the time, the fact that it was not mentioned suggests
Congress did not intend for it to survive the enactment of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. m Congress's intent to abandon Frye is also
evidenced by the fact that a "rigid 'general acceptance' requirement
would have been at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules
and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
"opinion" testimony."'8 5
Although not espousing a "general acceptance" standard, the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence still limit admissible evidence."' Likewise,
Daubert establishes boundaries of admissibility, allowing only evi-
dence which is both reliable13 7 and relevant."" The relevancy test un-
der both Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that
testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to de-
termine a fact in issue."39
The Court in Daubert states that reliability is established when an
expert's testimony is based on scientific knowledge.' The use of the
adjective "scientific" in Rule 702 "implies a grounding in the meth-
ods and procedures of science."'4 ' The word "knowledge" is inter-
preted by the Court as "connot[ing] more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation."42 Instead, knowledge "appl[ies] to any
body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts
or accepted as truths on good grounds."' The Court concedes that
scientific testimony does not need to be "known" to a certainty, since
138. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id-
136. But af Larvie, supra note 130, at 287 (stating that Daubert will give federal judges more
responsibility in evaluating scientific evidence and allow more admissible scientific evidence.
This will force attorneys to handle questionable, yet admissible, evidence by vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, careful instruction on the burden of proof and
increased use of directed judgments).
137. Daubertv. Merrell DowPharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993); see also Gier
v. Educational Service Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Neb. 1994) (holding that a psychia-
trist's testimony that the plaintiffs were sexually abused was not reliable, and therefore, inadmis-
sible).
138. Larvie, supra note 130, at 283 (stating that the Court in Daubert determined that rele-
vant evidence is admissible evidence).
139. Dauber; 113 S. Ct. at 2790; see Gianelli, supra note 119, at 32 (stating that evidence must
assist the trier of fact to establish a relevancy test, and courts often evaluate scientific validity
when determining relevancy).
140. DaubertI13S. Ct. at2795.
141. Id.
142. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786,2795 (1993).
143. Id- (quotingWEBSE'sTHMDNEVINT'LDICnONARY1252 (1986)).
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arguably, there are no certainties in science.44 However, the Court
requires "an inference or assertion be derived by the scientific
method" to be considered "scientific knowledge."'4 The Court con-
tinues to require that this knowledge be reliable and insists that
"evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity."'
The Supreme Court in Daubert has listed several factors to consider
when determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowl-
edge and thus reliable. 47 These factors include scientific testing,
peer review and publication, the known or potential rate of error,
and the presence of "general acceptance" within the relevant scien-
tific community.'O No single factor was considered by the Court to be
dispositive, rather each was considered a relevant factor which could
help determine whether to admit certain testimony.4' Since general
acceptance within the relevant scientific community is a factor, the
Fye standard continues to be considered.'
b) Evidence of Repressed Memories
The use of sodium amytal as a truth serum has not been generally
accepted within the scientific community,'5 ' and thus, does not pass
the Frye standard. Although it might be considered relevant, it is not
reliable'5 2 and also does not meet the requirements of Daubert."
Based on these conclusions, evidence of recovered memories ob-
tained during sodium anytal therapy should not be admitted in
court.
Under Daubert's interpretation of Rule 702, scientific evidence
must be "ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of science
and "connote more than [a] subjective belief or unsupported specu-
144. Id.
145. IR
146. Id. atn.9 (noting that scientists distinguish between validity, meaning that the principle
behind the knowledge shows what the knowledge purports to show, and reliability, meaning
that the results are consistent since the principle is applied).
147. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796.97 (1993).
148. Id.
149. SeeLarvie, supra note 130 and accompanying text.
150. Larvie, supra note 130, at 292 (warning that the inclusion of "general acceptance" as a
factorallows Fryeback into the analysis, and allovsjudges to possibly ignore Daubert).
151. SeLarvie supra note 130 and accompanying text.
152. Se supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text (explaining that sodium amytal therapy
studies and evaluations within the scientific community have not established the drug as a reli-
able tool in "recovering memories").
153. Larvie, supra note 130.
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lation."5 By interpreting the rule in such a manner, the Court in
Daubert sought to provide a standard for lower courts to determine
the validity and reliability of scientific evidence.5 Thus, testimony
involving an inference or assertion of scientific knowledge must be
supported by "'good grounds' based on what is known."'3 ' Daubert
dictates that before admitting scientific evidence, judges must con-
sider the ease of producing false results, 57 the outcome of peer re-
view, in and the known or potential rate of error.' Although re-
searchers have theorized as to why memories may be repressed, there
are no studies that fulfill the Daubert standard of utilizing 'methods
and procedures of science' to prove or disprove that repressed
memories actually exist.' 6° Thus, in the eyes of the court, repressed
memories do not meet the Daubert standard of reliability61 because
there is no way to establish that the recalled memories are true and
research has shown that recalled memories can be falsified. 
62
The possibilities of both truely repressed and falsely recalled
memories have been examined scientifically, but the outcome* of
such research remains inconclusive. Researchers are unable to de-
termine how often repressed memories are falsely recalled, leaving a
significant potential for error. Preliminary studies suggest that it is
possible for a person to falsely recall an event which never took
place. Additionally, people who recover memories of childhood
154. Daubertv. Merrell DowPharceuticals, 113 S.Ct. 2786,2795 (1993).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2796.
158. Id. at 2797.
159. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993).
160. Brenda C. Coleman, Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse Unreliable AMA Says,
Assoc. PRESS, June 15, 1994 (citing the AMA council who reported that "[uit is not yet knowt
how to distinguish true memories from ingrained events" in cases of childhood sexual abuse).
161. Dauber4 113 S. Ct. at 2795; see also MacNamara, supra note 4, at 86 (quoting David
Faigman, professor at Hastings College of Law, as stating that Daubed s requirement of scientific
data to support entry of scientific evidence, will make it very difficult to enter repressed memo.
ries into evidence).
162. See AMA Report, supra note 99 (citing a Statement of the American Psychiatric Assoc.
Board of Trustees, adopted Dec. 12, 1993, which reads:
"there is no completely accurate way of determining the validity of reports in the
absence of corroborating information.... [Flew cases in which adults make accu-
sations of childhood sexual abuse based on recovered memories can be proved or
disproved and it is notyet known how to distinguish true memories from imagined
events in these cases");
APA Issues Statement on Memories of Sexual Abuse, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, 26 (Feb. 1994) (stating that
no one knows how to accurately determine whether recovered memories are true memories).
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sexual abuse have later recanted their allegations.'o The significant
controversy surrounding these memories,' the high risk of error,
and researchers' inconclusive results forestalls repressed memory tes-
timony from fulfilling the evidentiary requirements established in
Daubert' 6 Also, the controversy surrounding the use of testimony
derived from repressed memories detracts from the idea of "general
acceptance" that the Court in Daubert felt should have some bearing
on admissibility of recovered memory testimony."
The exploration of repressed memories may be therapeutically
helpful.Y6 7 The Court, however, recognizes a difference between the
quest for truth in the courtroom and in the laboratory.es Scientific
conclusions are often subject to "perpetual revision" while law has
serious, immediate implications and must "resolve disputes finally
and quickly."'69 Therapeutic treatment of recovered memories as a
science is similar to the quest for truth in the laboratory. In a labora-
tory, it is necessary to test new techniques, as it may be in therapy,
when traditional methods are not successful. Novel science, while at
times appropriate in a laboratory or clinical setting, is not always ap-
propriate in a legal setting where a judge or jury facing a complex
scientific issue might show a science expert undue deference.70 In
the case of repressed memories, courts must be wary of allocating
undue deference to a scientific theory that remains highly controver-
sial.
The Court in Daubert also quoted Judge Weinstein as explaining,
"[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading be-
cause of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge,
in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, exercises more control over experts than over
163. See, ag., Meyer, supra note 1 (explaining how a woman whose father was convicted of
sexually abusing her as a child later recanted her allegations that her father abused her after
she stopped seeing her therapist, upon whom she heavily relied).
164. SeeAMAReport, supranote 99 (recognizing that "[c]onsiderable controversy has arisen
within the therapeutic community over the issue, and experts from varied professional back-
grounds can be found on all sides of the issue").
165. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786,2796-97 (1993).
166. Id. at 2797.
167. Id.at2798.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Richard D. Friedman, The Death and Transfiguration of Fye, 84 JURIETRICS J. 183,
146 (1994) (indicating that deference may be appropriate "the broader and more recurrent the
scientific issue is").
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lay witnesses."17' For this reason, caution must be exercised before
allowing experts from either side to testify about the merits of recov-
ered memories.
If the medical community continues to be sharply divided about
the validity of recovered memories as proof of childhood sexual
abuse, then the legal system should not accept such memories as
evidence in a case against the abuser. Relying on unsubstantiated
theories about repressed memories of sexual abuse may result in
devastating consequences for both victims and their families.
Ill. SHOULD THE LEGAL SYSTEM PROVIDE REuEF TO INDIVIDUALS
HARMED BY THERAPISTS WHO ENCOURAGED RECOVERING MEMORIES?
The previous section discussed whether recovered memories
should be allowed in the courtroom as evidence of sexual abuse, in
light of disagreement among health care professionals about the va-
lidity of these memories. This section analyzes whether the legal sys-
tem should, in effect, regulate psychotherapy by allowing patients
and their families who are injured by falsely recovered memories, to
bring claims against therapists who encouraged recovery of the
memories.
A. Why Allow Legal Recourse?
Increasingly, society regards doctors as capable of mistakes and
thus, holds them liable for such in malpractice actions."7 Although
civil remedies do not eliminate the original harm, monetary awards
provide compensation for those injured,74 and, more importantly,
171. Dauber 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (quoting Weinstein, 138 F.R.D., at 632).
172. See generally VincentJ. Candelora, Facilitated Communication: A Sienti~fc Theory Or A Mode
Of Communication? Should Peaple With Autism Have A Voice In Court, 99 DICKINSON L. REV. 753
(1995) (explaining how courts accept testimony of sexual abuse through facilitated communica-
tions by autistic children). Facilitated communication is a controversial method that was devel-
oped in the late 1970s where a "facilitator" lightly holds an autistic child's hands on a keyboard,
enabling the child to communicate through typing. Id. at 753. During some of these communi-
cation sessions, allegations of sexual abuse began appearing. Controversy developed, however,
as to whether the communications were coming from the children or the facilitator. In con-
trolled settings where the facilitator was unaware of the questions being asked of the autistic
students, the students had a difficult time correctly answering the questions. Id. at 759 n.53. As
with testimony using recovered memories, there is no scientific consensus on the validity of fa-
cilitated communication. I& at 759 n.53. Courts remain divided over whether facilitated com-
munication is based on scientific technique or is merely a form of communication. Id. at 760-1;
see also Meyer, supra note 1.
173. 1 DAvID W. LOuISELL&HAROLD WILLiAMS, MEDICAL MALRACEICE 1-10 (1992) (noting
that the tort suit is the system that society has seemingly chosen for helping people injured by
doctor's mistakes).
174. Id. (stating that although the tort lawsuit and monetary compensation for physical or
mental injury is often inadequate, it is currently the only system available).
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a 6O 2171discourages professionals from repeating negligent acts. In the
context of recovered memories, allowing malpractice 6 suits against
negligent therapists would provide redress for those injured by the
creation of false memories and alert therapists to use care when elic-
iting memories of past events from patients.
Patients typically seek therapy to understand, or sometimes solve,
problems dealing with troubling aspects of their lives. In the course
of patient treatment, therapists sometimes hypothesize that re-
pressed memories of sexual abuse are the root of a patient's prob-
lems."' The patient, like her therapist, is anxious to find a "solution"
to her problem and places a tremendous amount of trust in her
therapist, often revealing her innermost secrets." ' Depressed pa-
tients may also be vulnerable and desperate for a cure. By identify-
ing past sexual abuse as the cause of a patient's problems, a therapist
increases the patient's level of dependence on the therapist. This
occurs because of the therapist's position as an authority figure and
the patient's desire for treatment.'79 Thus, the patient's vulnerable
position in this relationship should cause the therapist to exercise
extra care to safeguard against implanting memories.
Increasingly patients who have recovered memories of childhood
sexual abuse later allege that their recollections were, in fact, false
memories 8 The patient then believes that she has been victimized
175. See David W. Feeder, II, Comment, When Your Doctor Says, "You Have Nothing to Worry
About, "Don't Be So Sue: The Effect ofFabio v. Bellomo on Medical Malpractice Actions in Minnesota;
78 ]MNN. L. REV. 943,946 n.19 (1994) (stating that the failure of sound malpractice claims can
foster the continuation of malpractice and that malpractice law provides a "vital check on physi-
clans' broad power and discretion").
176. See BLACK'S IAW DIG'noNARY 959 (6th ed. 1990) (defining malpractice as
"[p]rofessional misconduct or unreasonable lack of skill").
177. Glenn Kessler, Repressed Memories-A Legal-Psychological Tangle of Hidden Horrors, N.Y.
NEWVDAY, Nov. 28, 1993 at 7 (discussing the rise in cases of repressed memories as the source of
problems like bulimia and depression).
178. See Steven L Smith, Mental Health Malpractice in the 1990s, 28 Hous. L. REv. 209, 216
(noting that the trust patients imbue in their therapists also serves as a limiting factor in the
number of malpractice claims filed against therapists); see also Feeder, supra note 175, at 946
n.20.
179. Sce Daniel Goleman, Plausible Explanation for False Memory Repoted, June 8, 1994 at E4
(noting that the "lay expectation is that whatever we remember should be true, but memory
does not work like a video camera"); Kessler, supra note 177 (quoting a member of the Ameri-
can Psychological Association Ethics Committee, "[pleople are very desperate and will latch
onto a reason for their depression. The diagnosis [of childhood sexual abuse] makes them
highly dependent on the therapist.").
180. S e.g., Meyer, supra note I (describing the legal furor over a woman's recantation of
charges of sexual abuse against her father following his acquittal); Kessler, supra note 177
(describing cases where therapists have been sued by patients and patient's alleged abusers on
grounds of negligently assisting a patient recover memories of childhood sexual abuse).
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not by the alleged abuser, but instead, by her therapist.' When this
occurs, the patient should have the opportunity to seek compensa-
tion through a malpractice claim, just like patients of other health
care professionals. Such suits would not only allow recovery to an in-
jured party, but they could also help to establish a standard of care.
for therapists to rely upon when treating future patients.
Malpractice suits against therapists are usually more complicated
than suits against medical doctors because there are less defined
standards of care in therapy and the injuries incurred are less easily
identifiable." Such mental injuries, however, can be just as serious
as their physical counterparts. The result is a more difficult standard
of proof.
Since the validity of recovered memories is controversial' 1r regula-
tion of therapists may be necessary to prevent unnecessary harm.
Mistakes are made in all fields, and therapists should not be penal-
ized for making honest, reasonable mistakes. False allegations of
sexual abuse, however, can harm both the patient and the patient's
family.e Therefore, legal protection for parties within the sphere of
injury may be necessary.
B. Problems With Allowing Suits Against Therapists
When therapists can be sued for use of certain treatments, the le-
gal system is, in effect, mandating how mental health professionals
should practice.' 8 Taking therapeutic discretion away from thera-
pists could be very harmful to patients, therefore, therapists should
181. Cf. Steven Horowitz, TheDoctrine ofInformed Consent Applied to Psychotherapy, 72 GEO. LJ.
1637, 1646 (1984) (quoting T -E HARVARD GUIDE To MODERN PSYCMATRY 358 (A. Nicholi ed.
1978) as stating that psychotherapy is "a serious undertaking with enormous potential for harm
as well as for healing").
182. SeeRobertF. Schopp & David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot dth Due Care: .Psycho-
therapists and Cystallized Standards of Tort Liability, 17 J. PSYCHI-rRY & I.AW 163, 173 (1989)
(stating that courts can create standards of care by outlining duties in malpractice cases and by
adopting professional standards in their determination of a duty).
183. See BARBARA A. WEMIER & ROBERT M. WETMET , LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH
CARE, at 152, 156, 164 (1993) (explaining that as a result of use of different schools of therapy
and a patient's oftentimes pre-existing condition, attaching a particular causal event to a resul-
tant symptom can sometimes be difficult).
184. See supra notes 33-55, and accompanying text (describing disagreement among thera-
pists about the validity of recovered memories).
185. But cf. Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tex. 1994) (holding that a psychologist has
no professional duty to a third party not to misdiagnose child abuse).
186. See WEINER & WETIsEIN, supra note 183, at 149 (indicating that for better or worse,
fear of liability affects how a therapist cares for her patient); c. Mark A. Small, LegalPsychology
and Therapeuticfursprudence, 37 Sr. Louis U. LJ. 675, 678 (1993) (stating that a primary form of
regulation for mental health professionals is state licensing laws).
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be given wide, latitude in deciding what is best for a patient.'" Still,
the legal system needs to oversee therapy methods, hopefully with
the help of therapists, to ensure that patients get at least a minimum
standard of care.
Another problem with subjecting mental health professionals to
tort liability is that it may cause therapists to be more careful during
therapy, which may decrease trust between the therapist and pa-
tient. 's This trust is thought to be an important component of suc-
cessful therapy,"" thus the patient may suffer from policies which
make malpractice suits against therapists more likely.
C. Do Not Forget The Patient
When deciding whether the mental health field should be regu-
lated by allowing lawsuits against therapists, the well-being of the pa-
tients must be considered. Therapeutic jurisprudence is a fairly new
area of mental health law,'9' which argues that the legal system
should consider therapeutic ramifications of policies and laws.'92
This does not mean that the best therapeutic outcome should always
be the primary factor in setting policy, but it should at least be con-
187. See Schopp & Wexer, supra note 182, at 172 (citing Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657
(1st. Cir. 1980)) (holding that a physician should be given discretion to balance harm to the
patient against the need to prevent violence when determining whether to force medications
on patients). Schopp and 'Wexler believe that this approach provides little guidance for courts'
review of the actions of physicians in negligent care cases. Schopp and 'WexIer, supra note 182,
at172.
188. So Schopp & 'Wexler, supra note 182, at 172 (recommending that courts utilize guide-
lines from professional organizations in conjunction with an individual doctor's professional
judgment in defining standards of due care); Cf. Feeder, supra note 175, at 945-46 (stating that
there must be a balance between a physician's liability concerns and checks on the physician's
power and discretion).
189. Schopp & Wexler, supra note 182, at 183-84 (explaining that the therapist-patient rela-
tionship is based on mutual trust and the patient's belief that the therapist has the patient's
well-being as her primary interest. Cautious therapy in the interest of avoiding liability can
cause the patient to lose trust in the therapist because a patient believes the therapist no longer
has her well-being as her primary interest.).
190. Schopp &Wexler, supranote 182.
191. See Ingo Keilitz, justice and Mental Health Systems Interactions; An Ovenriew and Introduction
to the SpecialIssu 16 JAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR 1 (1992) (arguing that mental health law originally
concentrated on patient rights, but since those issues have largely been addressed, mental
health law must now concentrate on the processes and systems of the laws themselves); Ingo
Keilitz and Ronald Roesch, ImprovingJusice and Mental Health Systems Interactions: In Search of a
NAewParadign, 16 TAw&Htf. BEHAVIOR5, 13 (1992) (advocating that the "interactions and the
interorganizational relations" of thejustice and mental health systems need to be more closely
studied).
192. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Back in to Mental Health Law, 16 LAW &
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 27, 32 (1992) (explaining that "therapeutic jurisprudence" approaches the
law as a "social force" that in the process of creating substantive rules or legal procedures "may
produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences").
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sidered
For example, creating specific standards of care may aid therapists
and courts alike in determining what is acceptable therapy for most
patients."4 A set standard of care, however, may limit the therapeutic
options available for the patient 9" Although a particular standard
might be fine for most patients, it may not be the optimal treatment
for every patient. 5 A conflict arises from the fact that a strict stan-
dard cannot accommodate all situations or an individual patient's
specific needs, but without a standard, there is no clear basis from
which to judge whether a doctor was acting reasonably. Therapists
may also feel uncomfortable disregarding a standard if it makes mal-
practice liability more likely.19 7 Thus, they might opt for a potentially
less beneficial type of therapy."8 Therapeutic jurisprudence calls for
the therapeutic effect on the individual patient to be considered
when standards of care are set and argues against strict standards
of care that would unduly restrict the options of both the therapist
and the paient 2
When deciding whether to allow suits against therapists for en-
couraging recovered memories, the effect on the patient must be
considered. If the goal of deterrence through attaching liability to
the encouragement of false memories is realized, therapists may be-
come less likely to encourage recovered memories."' If all recovered
memories are false memories, this is a desirable result.202 If some
memories, however, are true memories, then therapists should be
193. Id. (noting that the goal of therapeutic jurisprudence is to clarify "the therapeutic con-
sequences of legal arrangements" not to "trump other considerations").
194. .But cf. Steven Horowitz, Note, Tl Docfrine of!Informed Coent Applied toP4ch otherapy, 72
GEO. L.J. 1637, 1639 (1984) (stating that standards of care are difficult to determine in psycho-
therapy because few psychological therapies are universally accepted).
195. SeeSchopp &Wexler, supra note 182, at 175 (explaining that although a set standard of
care encourages doctors to act in a manner that protects patients in general, a set standard can
also diverge from the interests of a specific patient, thus forcing the doctor to act in a manner
that conflicts with the patient's best interests).
196. Schopp &Wexler, supra note 182, at 175.
197. Schopp & Wexler, supra note 182, at 178.
198. Schopp &Wexler, supra note 182, at 178.
199. Wexler, .supra note 192, at 32.
200. See Wexler, supra note 192, at 32 (arguing that therapeutic jurisprudence alms for a
"weighing of other potentially relevant normative values" including patient "autonomy" and
"liberty" in setting legal standards and practices).
201. SuSchopp &Wexler, supra note 182, at 174 (noting that one of the "general purposes"
of tort law is to encourage specific behavior that protects the interests of others).
202. But so Kessler, supra note 177, at 7 (stating that even if memories are false, working
through their underlying causes may still be therapeutically helpful to the patient).
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free to explore the possibilities with each patient."3 While we may
not want these unreliable memories to be used in the courtroom, it
may still be beneficial for them to be explored in therapy!"
Therapists should not necessarily be held to the same standard
when treating patients as should evidence which is to be admitted in
court. This is because it is important for new techniques to be tried,
potentially allowing psychotherapy to advance in its understanding
and implementation of appropriate therapy. Theories, however, such
as recovered memories, or techniques such as hypnosis, which are
not accepted by a significant segment of the mental health field,' °5
should be used with caution if patients may be injured in the proc-
ess.
D. Theories on Which to Sue
When injury results, a patient can sue a therapist for malpractice
based on a cause of action of negligence.2 6 To prove negligence, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant owed a duty of care to
the plaintiff, that this duty was breached, that injury resulted, and
that the injury was caused by the therapist's breach of duty.0 7
A duty between a therapist and a patient can be demonstrated
through the theory of a contract between the therapist and patient03
or by establishing that providing care creates a professional relation-
ship and with it, a dutyY9 Establishing the breach of duty is more
203. Id.
204. SeeBruce Bower, Child Seeual Abzue. Sensoy Recall and Treating Survivors, SCIENCE NEWS,
June 4, 1994 at 365 (noting that the trauma of childhood sexual abuse may "interfere with the
brain's conscious recall system" and that therapy based either on the past trauma or present
problems of the patient helped to reduce depression).
205. See Kanovitz, supra note 81 (citing an American Medical Association Report that states
that therapists disagree about whether memories can be repressed and later recovered); cf su-
pra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (explaining that the use of hypnosis has different uses
therapeutically and forensically).
206. See Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Malpractice in the 1990s, 28 Hous. L. REV. 209, 218
(1991) (stating that "negligence is the most common form of malpractice liability," but that
other forms include battery, intentional infliction of mental distress, and false imprisonment);
see also Ira H. Leesfield, Negligenze of Mental Health Professionals: Wat Conduct Breaches Standards of
Care, 23 TRIAL57, 57-58 (1987) (listing therapy practices which are often found to be negligent,
including sexual misconduct, using inappropriate drug therapy, failing to prevent a suicide,
breaching the duty to warn third parties of violent acts of a patient, and breaching the duty of
confidentiality).
207. PROSSER&KEETON ON ToRTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
208. WEI ER - Varrsrou, supra note 183, at 151 (noting that a contract is established
when in return for a fee, the therapist provides the patient with services).
209. WEVER & WErSTEIN, supra note 183, at 151 (explaining that a duty arises when the
patient seeks care and the therapist provides it).
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challenging 1 First, it is difficult to prove that an injury was caused
by the therapist. Additionally, a lack of community standards of care
makes it difficult to determine what therapy should be used to satisfy
the duty.
21
'
To support a malpractice claim, a plaintiff must show that there is
a recognized standard in the medical community and the physician
in question negligently departed from the standard when treating
the patient 12 This is a difficult burden to meet for a patient who has
recovered memories.2 3 There are currently no standards for thera-
peutic use of recovered memories on which to base a claim.214 Still,
the number of suits fied against therapists are increasing2 15 and the
awards have been as high as 5.15 million dollars.2
There are some cases where it is clear that a therapist has breached
a standard of care. For instance, a therapist was found liable for neg-
ligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress when he in-
jected a patient with sodium pentothal between 141 and 171 times to
210. WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra note 183, at 151 (noting that without obvious negligence
an expert witness must be used to attempt to establish a standard of care that the provider fell
below).
211. Leesfield, supra note 205, at 57 (stating that professionals often do not agree on a di.
agnosis or treatmentand liability can only be established if it is shown that the therapist clearly
acted contrary to the correct treatment recognized within the profession (citing Bourgeois v.
Dade County, 99 So.2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1956)); see also WENMR & WETrSTIN, supra note 183, at
163-64 (suggesting that psychotherapy is the least likely area -where a malpractice suit will be
successful because there are no universally accepted guidelines as to what type of psychotherapy
should be used and when).
212. See LeBoeuf, supra note 24, at 97 (cting Davis v. Virginian Ry. Co., 361 U.S. 354, 857
(1960)).
218. Cf. John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 203 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that proba-
tive value should be shown more strongly when the evidence in question is esoteric in order to
prevent ajury from giving undue significance to that evidence).
214. Cf. J. Albert, L. Brown, S. Ceci, Christine Courtois, Elizabeth Loftus, & P. Omstein,
WORKING GROUP ON INVESTIGATION OF CHILDHOOD ABUSE FINAL P.EPORT, American Psychologi-
cal Ass'n (1996) (failing to establish clear guidelines for treatment of recovered memories but
explaining the issues involved and the viewpoints of various experts in the field).
215. Se Kessler, supra note 177, at 7 (noting that in 1989, five dvil and criminal cases were
filed in the United States and in 1992, 50 cases were filed).
216. See Kessler, supra note 177, at 7 (citing the 1992 jury award for a 83 year-old woman
from Akron, Ohio, who after recovering memories of incest, accused her uncle of sexmlly abus-
ing her as a child).
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determine whether the patient was sexually abused by her mother.21 7
Some therapists may use nothing more than "talking therapy," but
may illicit such unbelievable "memories" of sexual abuse that thera-
peutic negligence seems obvious.2'8 Other cases, however, are more
subtle. A therapist may simply suggest that the patient may have
been sexually abused, so maybe she should think about it, and see if
any memories resurface.2 9
.E Parents suing therapists
Not only do patients suffer when false memories are recovered,
but, the patient's family often suffers as well, especially when a rela-
tive is accused of abuse. Family members may lose their jobs, endure
avoidance by the patient, or become maligned in their community.
For these reasons, a patient's family members may wish to sue a
therapist who has assisted in recovering memories. It is more diffi-
cult to prevail when a claim is made by a patient's relative against a
therapist, rather than by the patient herself.2 ' To prove negligence
on the part of a therapist, a family member must first show that the
therapist owes him or her a duty of care.2 This duty is more difficult
217. Joyce-Couch v. DeSilva, 602 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ohio App. 1991) (noting that the patient
indicated early on in the therapy through the use of sodium pentothal that she bad been sexu-
ally abused by her mother yet the therapist continued injecting the patient with sodium pen-
tothal for four years despite increasing signs of distress, including addiction to sodium pen-
tothal). The court in this case noted that sodium pentothal is an "accepted form of treatment
to discover repressed traumatic events hidden in a patient's subconscious." Id. at 288. However,
there was "no medical justification" for the large number of treatment sessions conducted. Id.
at 293. The court also found malice in the therapist's conduct from evidence presented indicat-
ing that the therapist told the patient to masturbate and rub her breasts during the sodium
pentothal therapy to try to help her remember the abuse. Id.
218. See Kessler, supra note 177, at 7 (citing the case of Laura Pasley who settled her case for
a six-figure sum after suing her therapist for implanting false memories of being sexually abused
by her mother, brother, grandfather and others; Laura Pasley eventually decided that her
memories stemmed from horror movies she saw as a child). Id.
219. See Kessler, supra note 177, at 7 (quoting Mitch Bobrow, a therapist who says he can
sense when a patient has been sexmally abused, even if the patient has no such memories. He
says that he uses psychological "forceps" to help trigger memories. Bobrow has "helped" 25% of
his patients recover memories of sexual abuse.).
220. SeeBert Black, FranciscoJ. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, &iene and the Law in the Wake
ofDaubert: A New SearchforScient fiKowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 718-20 (1994) (citing exam-
ples of problems which may occur as a result of incorrect nonscientific conclusions in trials).
221. Brian D. Gallagher, Damages, Durress, and theDiscovey Ruler: The Statutoy Right of Reovey
for ricims of ChildhoodSexualAbus, 17 SErON HALLLEGIS.J. 505,533 (1993).
222. See note 23 and accompanying text (stating that suits by fathers are most likely since
recovered memories generally involve incest).
223. See Leesfield, supra note 206, at 57-58 (listing therapy practices which are often found
to be negligent, including having sex with a patient, using inappropriate drug therapy, failing to
prevent a suicide, breaching the duty to warn third parties, and breaching the duty of confiden-
tiality).
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to prove than in most negligence cases, as the family member is a
third party in the therapist-patient relationship. It is clear that a
therapist owes a duty of care to the patient, but it is less clear
whether this duty extends to family members.
The general rule is that a duty of care can extend to a third party
when it is foreseeable that actions, or inactions, will affect a third
party. Duty can also be established by determining that the defen-
dant's conduct is directed, at least in part, at the plaintiff, or when
there is a relationship between the actor and the third party, such as
a therapist and parent. Several factors may be considered to help
determine whether a duty exists to a third party. These factors in-
clude "the foreseeability, and likelihood of injury, weighed against
the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden
of guarding against injury or harm, and the consequences of placing
the burden upon the actor." 2' In .Montoya v. Bebensee,2 the court
held that there is social utility for therapists to report possible child
abuse, but there is also a risk of substantial injury if one is falsely ac-
cused.2"
Another cause of action available to family members injured by
224. SeeVineyard v. Kraft, 828 S.W.2d 248, 252 (Tex. Cr. App. 1992) and Dominguez v. Kelly,
786 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex. Cr. App. 1990) (holding that a therapist does not owe a duty of care
to a patient's parents); Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 769 (holding that a psychologist has no professional
duty to the father of a patient where the psychologist falsely accused the father of sexually abus-
ing his child. The court stated that the public good of diagnosing sexual abuse outweighs the
risk of misdiagnosis.).
225. See Slaughter v. Legal Process and Courier Serv., 162 Cal. App.3d 1236, 1249 (1984)
(stating that whether a duty is owed "depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and upon a
weighing of policy considerations for and against imposition of liability"); Dillon v. Legg, 68
Cal.2d 728, 740 (1968) (stating that the primary factor in determining duty is whether it is rea-
sonably foreseeable that the plaintiffwill suffer emotional distress); Montoya v. Bebensee, 761
P.2d 288, 288 (Colo. C. App. 1988) (stating that a "mental health provider owes a duty to re-
frain from taking actions of her own that may foreseeably result in injury to another").
226. Se Mollen v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980) (holding that
a doctor owed the plaintiff a duty because it was foreseeable that the plaintiff-would suffer emo-
tional distress); see also Britton v. Soltes, 563 N.E.2d 910, 912 (11. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that a
doctor's failure to diagnose tuberculosis in a patient, who subsequently infected his fani, did
not extend a duty to the patient's family, since injury to the family was not foreseeable); Sullivan
v. Cheshier, 846 F. Supp. 654, 660 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that parents may not sue their
daughter's psychologist when the psychologist helped their daughter "remember" sexual abuse
by an older sibling. The court held that parents can only sue if the psychologist's actions were
directed against the parents, and, ifa false memory was imposed.).
227. See Smith v. Pust, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 368 (Cal. C. App. 1993) (stating that a claim
may be made where there is a professional relationship between the plaintiff and defendant
and a meaningful connection between the wrongful act and the relationship).
228. Smith v. Denver, 726 P.2d 1125,1127 (Colo. 1986).
229. 761 P.2d 288 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
230. SeeI& (holding a therapist liable for suggesting limited visitation rights for a father ac-
cused ofsexually abusing his child).
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false accusations of sexual abuse is loss of consortium."a Some
courts allow malpractice claims for negligent and intentional inter-
ference of the parent-child relationship.2s Other courts, however,
restrict loss of consortium claims to spousal relationships." Loss of
consortium damage should be permitted, however, when a therapist
encourages a patient to end relations with her parents, as this inter-
feres with the parent-child relationship.234 Damages would most
likely increase if this harm was intentional.2 Finally, several states
have statutory provisions that allow a parent to collect damages for
the loss of the parent-child relationship.
231. Consortium is defined as "conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of
each to the company, society, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal
relation." Loss of consortium consists of other intangibles such as companionship and sexual
relations. BLAC 'SI.AWDICTIONARY509 (6th ed. 1990).
232. SewKunz v. Deitch, 660 F. Supp. 679, 683 (N.D. I. 1987) (holding that a father could
sue his parents for trying to separate him from his son); Person v. Behnke, 611 N.E.2d 1350,
1353-55 (M11. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that a father could have a valid claim for loss of custody and
visitation rights); Dymek v. Nyquist, 469 N.E.2d 659, 665-65 (I1. 1984) (holding that a father was
allowed to sue his ex-wife and her psychiatrist for destroying his relationship with his son);
Bullard v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ill. 1984) (holding that when malpractice causes the
death of a child, parents may sue for a loss of the parent-child relationship); Sanchez v. Schin-
dler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 252-53 (Tex. 1983) (stating that 35 states allow parents to recover for the
loss of companionship and society of their children in a vrongful death action); Shockley v.
Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Wis. 1975) (allowingfor recovery of damages for loss of companion-
ship, comfort, aid and society of a child). But see Baxter v. Superior Court, 563 P.2d 871, 874
(Cal. 1977) (holding that while a parent may not sue for loss of consortium, the parent is not
barred from a suit for interference with the parent-child relationship); Curtis v. Cook, 440
N.E.2d 942, 947-48 (Il1. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that a parent may not sue for loss of the parent-
child relationship).
233. SeeAlberv. fllnois Dep't of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 786 F. Supp.
1340, 1364-65 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that even intentional interference between a parent and
child relationship was not actionable); Dralle v. Ruder, 529 N.E.2d 209, 214-215 (I1. 1988)
(holding that suit for loss of consortium of a child is prohibited where the injury to the parent is
simply the "derivative consequence of an injury to the child"); Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows,
Inc., 475 A.2d 19, 22 (N.H. 1984) (holding, in a case where two children were killed when an
amusement ride malfunctioned, public policy precluded the creation of a new cause of action
for negligently injured or killed children. The reasons the court listed included: the insuff-
dency of money to replace a lost child, the emotional nature of the situation, and an increase in
insurance premiums.).
234. See Surina v. Lucey, 214 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a third
party may not interfere with a parent's rights to custody, even if the interference is motivated by
kindness to the child); RESrATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1987); PROSSER ON TORTS §
124 (1984) (stating that loss of services is not essential for interference with the relation).
235. Plante v. Engel, 469 A2d 1299, 1801 (N.H. 1983) (holding that a claim of loss of con-
sortium of a child is acceptable where there was intentional interference with parental custody);
PROSSER, I&woFTORT §7 (5th ed. 1971).
236. Se, eg., IDAHO CODE § 5-310 (1979) (inrpretd in Hayward v. Yost, 242 P.2d 971 (Idaho
1952) to include the loss of protection, comfort, society and companionship); IowAR. Civ. P. 8
(1983) (stating that parent may sue "for actual loss of services, companionship, and society" and
reflecting the holding of Wardlowv. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1971)); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. 4.24.010 (West 1983) (stating an action for damages for loss of services, support,
love and companionship, and injury to or destruction of the child-parent relationship and re-
flecting the holding in Lockhart v. Bisel, 426 P.2d 605 (Wash. 1967)). But seeALA. CODE § 6-5-
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There are several reasons why negligent interference and inten-
tional interference tort claims are rejected in recovered memory
cases. First, a tort remedy is still available to the directly injured
party-27 Second, if claims could be brought by both the family mem-
bers of patients and the patient herself, there would be a multiplica-
tion of claims against the therapist.' Finally, the difficulty in deter-
mining damages is too greatss
A more difficult, but sometimes more successful cause of action
for parents is infliction of emotional distress. This claim is generally
only allowed if the plaintiff was in the zone of danger, an area de-
termined by the proximity of the third party to the commission of
the tort in terms of time, location, and relationship.2 0
F. Juy Orders Therapist To Pay FatherFive Hundred Thousand Dollars
Recently, a California court set precedent by awarding a father ac-
cused of sexually molesting his daughter, $500,000.00 in damages
from the daughter's therapist 41 The daughter, Ramona, was diag-
nosed with bulimia nervosa.24 A marriage, family and child coun-
selor (MFCC), told the daughter's mother that eighty percent of all
people who suffer from eating disorders were sexually abused as
children. 24 When the MFCC told the daughter that eating disorders
strongly correlate with sexual abuse, the daughter did not know
whether or not she was abused.2" Through therapy, she began hav-
ing mental flashbacks of abuse, but did not know whether they were
real events.2" To determine whether these flashbacks were real, the
390 (1975) (stating that there is no recovery for the loss of a child's society).
237. Dra/!4 529 N.E.2d at 213 (stating that a monetary amount may be used to remedy the
devalued parent-child relationship and the difficulty in assigning such an amount).
238. Dralle 529 N.E.2d at 218.
239. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
240. See Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 307-08 (N.H. 1979) (stating that if the zone of dan-
ger is well defined, then allowing third parties to use this cause of action will not lead to unlim-
ited liability).
241. Ramonav. Isabella (Cal. Sup. Crt. C61898, 1994).
242. Ramonav. Isabella (Cal. Sup. Crt. C61898, 1994) (Mother's Deposition 13/18-16/7).
243. Ramona v. Isabella (Cal. Sup. C. C61898, 1994) (Mother's deposition 65/9-67/24).
This statistic is contradicted by Dr. Harrison G. PopeJr. of Harvard Medical School who found
that the rate of childhood sexual abuse in bulimics is no different than the general population.
Dr. Harrison G. PopeJr., Childhood Sexual Abuse and Bulimia Nervosa: A Comparison of American,
Austrian, and Brazilian Women, 151 Am. J. PSYCHAIRY 732, 735 (1994) (stating that 24% to 86%
of bulimic women from 3 countries reported childhood sexual abuse and these percentages are
not greater than those found in the general population).
244. Pope, supra note 244.
245. Pope, supra note 244.
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counselor brought the daughter to a psychiatrist to be tested with
sodium amytal * " The psychiatrist told the counselor and the daugh-
ter that one cannot lie under sodium amytal, unless trained to do
so. 2417 During the sodium amytal testing, the daughter believed that
her father had raped her; afterwards however, she could not recall
whether her statements were true.24 When she questioned the valid-
ity of her memories, the psychiatrist told Ramona that her memories
must be true.2 Since these events, Ramona has had an unshakable
belief that her father raped her and has filed a civil action against
him. Consequently, Ramona's mother filed for divorce, her father
lost his job, and his reputation has been ruined.2'
Following the discovery of Ramona's repressed memories, Ra-
mona's father sued the psychiatrist for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. As stated above, a duty is owed to a third party when
it is foreseeable that the third party will be injured and when actions
are directed, at least in part, at the third party.22 Since sodium amy-
tal was used to determine if Ramona's father raped her, Ramona's
father was the object of the procedure, and thus the therapist owed a
duty of care to him. 3 The court determined that the psychiatrist's
behavior of telling the counselor and Ramona that Ramona could
not lie under sodium amytal therapy was outrageous and extreme,
and, therefore, there was a triable issue of material fact!" The jury
determined that since Ramona's father suffered grave injury, he was
entitled to an award of $500,000.00.
G. Preventing Injury To Both Patients and Parents Through Informed
Consent
In addition to allowing suits for malpractice or negligence, thera-
pists can protect patients and their families by obtaining a patient's
informed consent before performing memory recovery procedures.
246. Pope, supranote 244.
247. Ramonav. Isabella (Cal. Sup. Ct. C61898,1994) (Marriage, family and child counselor's
deposition 54/4-20). Dr. Martin T. Ome states that sodium amytal is not useful in obtaining the
truth, instead it makes the patient believe in the truth of a statement.
248. Il
249. Id.
250. Ramonav. Isabella (Cal. Sup. Cr. C61898, 1994).
251. Id.
252. SeeMolienv. YaiserFoundation Hospitals, 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980).
253. Rarnonav. Isabella, (Cal. Sup. Crt. C61898,1994).
254. Id
255. Id
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Informed consent serves three purposes: it enables patients to avoid
harm and to retain control over their therapy, it encourages thera-
pists to consider the pros and cons of a particular therapy, and it in-
creases a patient's chances of recovery if harmed by an unscrupulous
therapist."
The concept of informed consent originated with the landmark
case of Mohr v. Williams.2 7 Initially, this doctrine required doctors to
obtain consent for treatment, but eventually expanded to require
doctors to give patients enough information about therapies so that
patients can make educated decisions as to whether to accept that
form of treatment.m
Informed consent generally requires a patient to be informed of
the potential benefits and risks of the contemplated therapy, the ex-
pected prognosis with and without treatment, and any possible al-
ternative treatments." 9 Suits based on lack of informed consent can
be based on lack of competence to consent to treatment, lack of vol-
untariness or lack of sufficient information."W
There are two standards which are used to determine whether the
patient has received enough information. The first is a professional
standard, which determines whether the information received was
the information another professional in the particular jurisdiction
would have given. 2 ' The second standard is the reasonable patient
standard, which requires the professional to give as much informa-
tion as a reasonable patient would desire.262 To win a suit based on a
failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must show that the
risks involved with a therapy should have been disclosed; the risks
256. Horowitz, supra note 181, at 1637,1640.
257. 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905) (holding a doctor guilty of battery if he does not receive
consent from a patient prior to giving treatment); see also WEINER & WETisTEiN, s Upra 183, at
115 (stating that thejudicial doctrine of informed consent began as early as 1914, with the rec-
ognition that patients have the right to refuse needed medical treatment).
258. WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra note 183, at 115 (explaining that the therapist has the
burden of giving the patient necessary information).
259. WEINER & WETrsTEIN, supra note 183, at 118; see also Hunter L. Prillaman, A Physidan's
Duty toInform ofNewl Developed Therapy, 6j. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoLY 43, 45 (1990) (stating
that informed consent requirements include informing patients of potential complications or
possible problems with a certain therapy and any possible alternative treatments. A physician
must provide as much information as a reasonable medical practitioner would provide and as
much as a reasonable patient would want to know.).
260. WEINER & WETTMIN, supra note 183, at 216; see also Horowitz, supra note 181, at 1642
(stating that a patient who did not give consent, or was not competent to give consent, could
sue for battery and that a patient who was not given sufficient information may have a cause of
action in negligence).
261. WEINER& WETrSTEIN, supra note 183, at 218.
262. WEINER&WETrSTEiN, supranote 183, at 218.
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were not, in fact, disclosed; the risks materialized; the patient would
not have accepted the therapy if she knew of the risks involved; and
that the materialized risks resulted in injury.26
In recovered memory cases, the patient could be warned that the
methods used are experimental, or not accepted by others in the
profession, so that the patient does not base major life decisions
solely on novel techniques.2" The Committee on Privacy and Confi-
dentiality of the California State Psychological Association recom-
mends that therapists give patients three documents before begin-
ning psychotherapy-a client's rights statement, an initial contract
form and an informed consent form, that disclose some of the risks
of psychotherapy.2 Horowitz argues that use of these documents
would ensure that therapists inform patients, establish a profession
standard of care and help reduce problems of proof during litiga-
tion.6
Informing a patient that recovered memories are not universally
accepted can help patients control therapy outcomes. Although re-
covering past memories may help patients understand current psy-
chological problems, these memories may be devastating to both the
patient and the patient's family. Worse yet, if these memories prove
to be false, the family will have suffered unnecessary and irreparable
harm. Thus, informed consent is as important in therapy as in all
other health professions.6 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Sexual abuse is a heinous crime and the legal system must do eve-
rything possible to punish abusers and protect victims. This must
not, however, include accepting unverified theories to establish the
existence of sexual abuse. Protection is not only needed for those
263. Horowitz, supra note 194, at 1658.
264. For example, the American Psychiatric Association Board Statement on Memories of
Sexual Abuse states that "it may be important to caution the patient against making major life
decisions during the acute phase of treatment." Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Statement on Memories
of SexualAbuse, Dec. 12, 1993 at4. This advice contradicts therapists' frequent suggestion that
patients break off relations with family members who do not believe that their recalled memo-
ries of sexual abuse actually occurred. But sem Horowitz, supra note 194, at 1652 (stating that
disclosing possible negative effects of a particular treatment might harm the subsequent ther-
apy).
265. Horowitz, supra note 194, at 1662-63.
266. Horowitz, supra note 194.
267. Consent does not foreclose the ability for a patient to sue for injuries. Cf LeBoeuf,
sup a note 24, at 97 (explaining that in cases where therapists have sexual relations with pa-
tients, consent is irrelevant because the sex would not have taken place but for the therapeutic
relationship, therefore, the injury occurred due to therapy).
245Fall 1996]
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW
abused, but also for those falsely accused of sexual abuse, and for
those falsely led to believe that they were victims of sexual abuse.
Courts in the United States have developed a trend to accept evi-
dence of abuse as recovered memories, elicited through therapy.
Public pressure to eradicate sexual abuse, however, must not lead to
the premature acceptance of recovered memories of sexual abuse.
That does not help the patient, nor anyone else involved.
The legal system must provide a legal recourse to individuals who
are injured by therapists negligently encouraging patients to recover
memories. The injuries incurred by a patient falsely believing her
father raped her can be extremely serious. Therefore, therapists
must use caution before they damage someone's life by utilizing a
theory that is not widely accepted as valid by the mental health
community. If a therapist truly believes the recovered memories are
real, one way to minimize potential harm is to inform the patient
that not all therapists agree that recovered memories are true
memories. This way, a therapist may still continue therapy in the way
she thinks best and a patient is not left believing that she must have
been abused.
The legal system must protect innocent citizens. It must not em-
bark on a crusade to eradicate childhood sexual abuse by admitting
evidence of recovered memories when the very existence of recov-
ered memories is questioned within the mental health field. If the
mental health field determines that recovered memories are true
memories, then the legal system should take that knowledge and use
it in the courts. Until that time, however, those accused of sexual
abuse by unreliable memories must be protected so that they do not
become the real victims of recovered memories.
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